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LIABILITY IN TORT FOR THE SEXUAL
TRANSMISSION OF DISEASE: GENITAL HERPES
AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Several million Americans suffer from genital herpes, an incurable
and highly contagious sexually transmitted disease.' In the past two
years, a number of victims of genital herpes have filed suit to recover
damages from sexual partners who infected them with the disease.2 A
few of these plaintiffs have been successful. In 1983, a Washington State
judge awarded $40,000 to a woman who contracted genital herpes from
her husband.3 In January 1984, an Iowa judge awarded $50,000 to a
woman who sued her ex-husband for infecting her with genital herpes.4
The Second District Court of Appeal in California also recently uplheld
the right to sue in tort for the sexual transmission of genital herpes.5
The increased incidence of genital herpes poses an immediate
health threat to the American public. The disease is recurrent and is
I It is estimated that as many as 20 million Americans are infected with genital herpes.
See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, No. 567066-6 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, filed Dec.
21, 1982), reported in Williamson, Wfe Sues Husband For Giving Her Herpes, San Francisco
Chron., Mar. 25, 1983, at 2, col. 5. In Olson, the plaintiff is suing her husband for punitive
and compensatory damages alleging battery, fraud, and negligence for infecting her with
genital herpes. See also Liptrot v. Basini, No. 82-19427 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County, filed
Sept. 20, 1982), reportedin Mellowitz & Rojas, Herpes: A Causefor LegalAction?, Nat'l LJ., Nov.
8, 1982, at 3, col. 1. Plaintiff Liptrot sued her former lover for fraudulently concealing that he
had genital herpes, and subsequently infecting her with the disease. There was a voluntary
dismissal of the suit on June 6, 1984. See also St. Clair v. St. Clair, No. DR82-3962 (Mo. Cir.
Ct., Jackson County, filed 1982), reported in Ostroff, New Case of Herpes: Banker Sued by Wife,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 2, col. 4. Plaintiff has sued her husband for six million dollars in
damages for infecting her with genital herpes. See also Wife Says Mate Has Herpes and Sues Him
for 5100,000, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1983, at B8, col. 3. In this suit, Alex v. Alex, filed in Wayne
County, Michigan, plaintiff sought damages for "social stigma, humiliation, medical expenses
and 'physical changes to herself and any children she may have desired to bear.'" Id The
suit was settled out of court. Bunting, Herpes and the Law, Detroit Free Press, June 27, 1984
(NEWSBANK, HEA 77:G5 (1984)). See also Margolick, Herpes and Similar Matters Get More
Attention in Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at 24, col. 1 (genital herpes suits filed in Califor-
nia, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, and Washington).
3 Alquist-McCarley v. McCarley, Judgment upon Jury Verdict, No. 83-2-00413-4
(Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish County, Sept. 16, 1983). See also Margolick, supra note 2.
4 McGaw v. Mormann, No. CL 2021-0683 219-46-51C (Iowa Dist. Ct., Wapello
County, Jan. 3, 1984), reported in Ex-wifo wins S50,000 or case o herpes, Syracuse Herald-Ameri-
can, Jan. 8, 1984, at A14, col. 1. The court found the defendant in default for failure to plead
and determined that the woman was entitled to damages from her former spouse for his
"willful or intentional act" of infecting her with genital herpes. McGaw, at 2.
5 Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
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presently incurable.6 Genital herpes infections acquired by newborns
during passage through the birth canal are often fatal or lead to serious
physical and mental impairments. 7 In addition, there is an association
between genital herpes infection and cervical cancer.8 Finally, victims
of the disease often suffer emotional and psychological distress. 9
This Note contends that courts should impose liability for the trans-
mission of genital herpes to advance the public policy objectives of ar-
resting the spread of this disease, protecting the health and well-being of
the American population, and guarding against serious or fatal infec-
tions of the newborn. First, the Note describes the health dangers posed
by the genital herpes epidemic.' 0 This Note then analyzes the applica-
tion of standard tort doctrines-negligence, battery, and misrepresenta-
tion-to the sexual transmission of this disease."I The Note contends
that a legally enforceable duty arises in sexual relationships to protect
against the transmission of genital herpes. Furthermore, the infected
partner should have an affirmative obligation to disclose his disease
before engaging in sexual activity. 12 An infected partner's failure to
comply with this obligation is a breach of that duty and a basis for lia-
bility in negligence.
Although battery or misrepresentation may serve as alternative
grounds for liability, this Note argues that the broader scope of negli-
gence liability better serves the public policy objective of controlling the
spread of genital herpes infection. 13 The Note also explains that, in
most jurisdictions, the traditional defenses of interspousal tort immunity
and of the illegality of premarital or extramarital sexual conduct no
longer preclude liability for the sexual transmission of genital herpes. 14
Finally, the Note maintains that an individual's right to privacy in sex-
ual matters is subordinate to the public interest in controlling the spread
of this disease and should not preclude a cause of action for genital
herpes transmission.15
6 See infra notes 34-39 & 43-46 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
8 See in/ra note 47 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
10 See infia notes 26-57 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 58-189 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 79-127 and accompanying text. This Note generally employs male pro-
nouns for the transmitter, although the disease may be transmitted by either the male or
female sexual partner. Furthermore, this Note only addresses liability between sexual part-
ners. Except for selected comments, it does not evaluate the liability of the transmitter of the
disease to third parties. For an example of such a third-party suit, see Jaffee v. Dills, No.
84CI-02139 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, filed Mar. 19, 1984), reported i'n Wolfson, Herpes
Suits Enter the Third-Party Realm, Nat'l L. J., May 7, 1984, at 3, col. I (professor suing lawyer for
allegedly infecting professor's wife who then infected professor).
13 See infra notes 139-89 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 218-39 and accompanying text.
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TRANSMISSION OF DISEASE
I
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
This section discusses the current genital herpes epidemic, describes
the symptoms of the disease, and summarizes the serious health and
emotional problems that result. The health risks associated with this
disease underscore the need to limit its spread.
Until the mid-1950s, the medical profession achieved considerable
success in combatting venereal disease in the United States. 16 This suc-
cess was attributable to the use of antibiotics and an emphasis on early
detection. In the late 1950s, there occurred a resurgence of venereal dis-
ease. 17 More frequent premarital and extramarital sexual activity and
the popularity of new contraceptive techniques that offer less protection
against disease contributed to the increase in venereal disease infec-
tion. 18 Medical authorities now consider sexually transmitted diseases
to be a major health problem, causing victims "enormous suffering" and
costing the nation "billions of dollars annually."' 9
In the last few years the spread of genital herpes, a sexually trans-
mitted disease previously unfamiliar to most of the general population,
has become a prominent health concern.20 Genital herpes now affects
16 L. LASAGNA, THE VD EPIDEMIC 1-2 (1975).
17 Recent statistics demonstrate the upward trends of venereal disease infection:
Primary and Secondary Rates per 100,000
Cases of Syphilis Population
1956 6,395 3.4
1960 16,145 9.1
1980 27,204 12.0
1981 31,266 13.7
Cases of Rates per 100,000
Gonorrhea Population
1956 224,683 135.7
1960 258,933 145.3
1980 1,004,029 443.3
1981 990,864 435.2
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE (STD) STATISTICAL LETrER: CALEN-
DAR YEAR 1981, Table 3, Table 4 (1982).
The actual incidence of gonorrhea may be considerably higher if estimates of unreported
cases are included in the totals. Sparling, Neisseria gonorrhoeae, in 2 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1655, 1655 (G. Mandell, R.G, Douglas &J. Bennett eds. 1979) (one
million reported cases of gonorrhea in 1977, but annual incidence "probably closer" to three
million cases); see also Sexually Transmitted Diseases Afct I in 20 Americaas, 95 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 496, 496 (1980) (gonorrhea affects estimated two million Americans annually).
18 L. LASAGNA, supra note 16, at 5-9; see also Wiesner & Parra, Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases: Meeting the 1990 Objectives-a Challenge for the 1980s, 97 PUB. HEALTH REP. 409, 409
(1982).
19 Wiesner & Parra, supra note 18, at 409. The Surgeon General considers sexually
transmitted diseases one of the United States' major health priority areas. Id.
20 Although current publicity would suggest that genital herpes originated recently, it
was described in the medical literature in the early 1700s and was a known affliction in the
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more Americans than syphilis and may soon surpass gonorrhea as the
most prevalent sexually transmitted disease.2 ' Accurate information
concerning the incidence and prevalence of genital herpes is unavailable
because, unlike gonorrhea and syphilis, physicians and medical clinics
are not normally required to report genital herpes cases to state health
authorities. 22 It is estimated that from ten to twenty million Americans
now suffer from the disease,23 with 300,000 to 500,000 new cases each
year.24 Even though the total number of cases is unknown, the upward
trend since the 1960s confirms the medical view of an "ongoing
epidemic." 25
A. Description of the Disease26
Genital herpes is a contagious viral infection transmitted by inti-
mate physical contact. 27 The mucous membranes and soft skin of the
18th and 19th centuries. Corey, The Natural Histog of Genital HSV, HELPER, Mar. 1982, at 1.
[THE HELPER is published quarterly by The Herpes Resource Center, a program service of
the American Social Health Association.]. The physician to the king of France is credited
with the first description of genital herpes in 1736. Hirsch, Herpes Simplex Virus, in 2 PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1283, 1283 (G. Mandell, R.G. Douglas & J.
Bennett eds. 1979). Its recent epidemic spread is unprecedented, however. See Subak-Sharpe,
"The Venereal Disease of the New Moralio," TODAY'S HEALTH, Mar. 1975, at 42, 42 (10 years
ago a "rare" condition, genital herpes now "exploding through the population").
21 See supra note 17; see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
22 Current Trends: ANonreported Sexual~y Transmissible Diseases-United States, 28 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 61 (1979). The five sexually transmissible diseases that are
usually reported include: gonorrhea, syphilis, chancroid, lymphogranuloma venereum, and
granuloma inguinale. Id.
23 W. WICKErr, HERPES: CAUSE & CONTROL 55 (1982) (quoting 1981 letter from the
Director, Venereal Disease Control Division, Centers for Disease Control, estimating that 10-
15 million Americans are infected); Herpes: The VD of the '80s, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1982, at
75, 75 (citing Federal Centers for Disease Control estimate that 20 million Americans have
disease); Questions From Our Readers, HELPER, Summer 1983, at 8, 9 (referring to National
Institutes of Health study group estimate of 20 million cases).
24 Sexually Transmitted Disease Control, PUB. HEALTH REP., at 49, 49 (Supp. to Sept.-Oct.
1983 issue) (500,000 new cases annually); Questions From Our Readers, supra note 23, at 9 (Na-
tional Institutes of Health study group estimate of 300,000-500,000 new infections each year).
25 Genital Herpes Infection-United States, 1966-1979, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 137, 138 (1982). Physician-patient consultations with fee-for-service, office-
based physicians for genital herpes infections rose from 29,560 in 1966 to 260,890 in 1979. Id.
at 137; see also Wiesner & Parra, supra note 18, at 413 (commenting on dramatic rise in
number of patient encounters with private physicians for genital herpes infections between
1966 and 1981). In contrast, a study in the early 1970s suggested an incidence of less than one
percent of genital herpes in the general population. Alexander, Herpes Simplex Virus: A Cause
for Concern, 48 AM. J. MED. TECH. 241, 242 (1982).
26 See generaly R. HAMILTON, THE HERPES BOOK (1980); R. RICHARDS, VENEREAL
DISEASES AND THEIR AVOIDANCE 83-84 (1974); W. WICKETT, supra note 23, at 24-36;
Nahmias & Hutton, Herpes Simplex, in COMMUNICABLE AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 301, 306
(F. Top & P. Wehrle 7th ed. 1972).
27 Genital herpes infection is caused by a virus, herpes simplex. There are two closely
related herpes simplex viruses, type 1 and type 2, and many strains of these two types. In
general, type I is associated with cold sores on the lips, tongue or mouth and type 2 is associ-
ated with genital infections. See also Nahmias, HSV DIAGNOSIS Clinical and Laboratoy,
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genital area are "sufficiently permeable" 28 to permit the virus to enter
the body. After initial exposure, a victim generally develops symptoms
within two to ten days.29 Initial symptoms of an infection may be itch-
ing or burning sensations in the genital area. A series of painful fluid-
filled blisters then develop at the site of infection.30 Lymph nodes in the
groin swell and become tender; flu-like symptoms such as muscle aches,
fever, and headache may be evident. The blisters rupture to form shal-
low, painful sores that eventually scab and heal.3 1 The initial outbreak
usually lasts fourteen to twenty-eight days. 32 The intensity of suffering
varies; indeed, some victims experience no overt symptoms when ini-
tially infected and thus remain unaware that they have contracted geni-
tal herpes. 33
Even though the sores associated with the initial infection heal, the
virus retreats to the nerve tissues of the body and lies dormant.3 4 At
HELPER, June 1982, at 5-6. An estimated 15% of genital herpes cases are type 1, and 85% are
type 2. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH PUB. No.
82-2005, GENITAL HERPES-QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
GENITAL HERPES-Q AND A]. Both virus types cause similar symptoms in the initial out-
break.
Medical authorities have studied the possibility of nonsexual transmission of genital
herpes. See, e.g., Nerurkar, West, May, Madden & Sever, Surnival of Herpes Simplex Virus in
Water Specimens Collected From Hot Tubs in Spa Facilities and on Plastic Surfaces, 250 J. A.M.A. 3081
(1983). Most observers discount transmission from inanimate objects. See Fomites and Herpes
Simplex Viruses, A Case for Nonvenereal Transmission?, 250 J. A.M.A. 3093, 3093 (nonvenereal
modes of transmission "uncommon"); Managing Recurrent Herpes, HELPER, Spring 1983, at 10,
10 (quoting medical officer in Venereal Disease Control Division of the Centers for Disease
Control: "It is our impression . . . that if nonsexual herpes transmission occurs at all, it is
rare.').
A victim may infect other parts of his own body by autoinoculation, that is by touching a
herpes sore and then touching other areas of his body. Corey, supra note 20, at 2.
28 R. HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 4-5.
29 GENITAL HERPES-Q AND A, supra note 27, at 2; see also Corey, supra note 20, at 2
(incubation period usually two to fifteen days but occasionally longer).
30 In men, lesions usually develop on the penis, but infection may also occur within the
urethra. In women, the lesions may develop in the vagina, cervix, or vulva. In either sex,
blistering may occur over the genital areas, thighs, and buttocks.
31 Scarring is not usual, but may occur. W. WICKETT, supra note 23, at 31.
32 PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HERPES GENI-
TAL INFECTION 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HERPES GENITAL INFECTION].
33 Nahmias, supra note 27, at 5. If the initial outbreak affects only the cervix, "which is
relatively insensitive to pain," a woman may be unaware of infection. Kagan, Herpes: It Can
Be Treated-But Not Cured, Ms., Jan. 1978, at 38, 38 (quoting director of Univ. of Washington
Venereal Diseases Research Center); see also HERPES GENITAL INFECTION, supra note 32, at 1
("infection of the cervix or vagina does not always cause symptoms').
There are several detection methods for the herpes virus, but the accuracy of these meth-
ods varies. See Moseley, Corey, Benjamin, Winter & Remington, Comparison of Viral Isolation,
Direct Immunoftiorescence, and Indirect Immunoperoxidase Techniquesfor Detection of Genital Herpes Sim-
plex Virus Infection, 13 J. CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY 913, 916-17 (1981); see also Solomon, Ras-
mussen, Varani & Pierson, The Tzanck Smear in the Diagnosis of Cutaneous Herpes Simplex, 251 J.
A.M.A. 633, 634-35 (1984) (suggesting'positive Tzanck preparation as accurate and economi-
cal device for early diagnosis).
34 R. HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 5-6.
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unpredictable intervals, the virus reactivates and the eruption of sores
reoccurs. 35 Recurrences vary in duration, severity, and frequency.36
Some individuals may be unable to recognize recurrences if the sores are
internal37 and the accompanying symptoms are nonexistent or mild.
Prior to the re-emergence of sores, a victim may notice symptoms of
burning, tingling or itching in the affected areas. 38 The sores associated
with these subsequent outbreaks customarily last from seven to fourteen
days.39
Victims of genital herpes are contagious during the initial attack
and during subsequent recurrences. This infectious state lasts from the
onset of the preliminary symptoms until the sores completely heal.40
Virtually all medical authorities recommend that those infected should
abstain from sex during outbreaks to avoid transmitting the disease.4 1
Because recurrences may not always be recognized, victims are some-
times unaware of their contagious state.42 For these sufferers, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain when they should refrain from sexual activity.
B. Long Range Health Impact
There is no effective cure or treatment for genital herpes currently
available.43 Although certain new vaccines and treatments show some
35 The cause of these recurrences is unknown, but it may include fever, emotional ten-
sion, premenstrual distress, or sexual intercourse. R. RICHARDS, supra note 26, at 83-84.
36 Corey, supra note 20, at 3. See generally Bierman, A Retrospective Study of 375 Patients with
Genital Herpes Simplex Infections Seen Between 1973 and 1980, HELPER, Fall 1983, at 1, 3-4. Re-
currences can develop at intervals ranging from days to years. Hirsch, supra note 20, at 1285.
Four or five outbreaks a year is average. Rovner, Health Talk: Herpes, Wash. Post, Mar. 12,
1982, at C5, col. 1; see also R. HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 6 (some victims of genital herpes
are spared recurrences); Corey, supra note 20, at 3 ("mean to median" number of total recur-
rences between four and seven).
37 The sores may be located within the vagina or urethra.
38 These "prodromal" symptoms may last from a few hours to several days. R. HAMIL-
TON, supra note 26, at 47; Hirsch, supra note 20, at 1287.
39 HERPES GENITAL INFECTION, supra note 32, at 2.
40 GENITAL HERPES--Q AND A, supra note 27, at 3; Corey, supra note 20, at 2; Questions
from Our Readers, HELPER, Dec. 1982, at 10 (quoting head of virology department at Univ. of
Washington). During latent periods, "when the virus is lying dormant in nerve tissue, trans-
mission cannot occur." R. HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 88-89.
41 HERPES GENITAL INFECTION, supra note 32, at 2; Herpes: The VD of the '80s, supra note
23, at 76; Questions From Our Readers, supra note 40, at 10; see also R. HAMILTON, supra note 26,
at 93 (advocating abstention from sexual activity until sores completely disappear). Although
the use of male prophylactic devices may inhibit the transmission of disease during outbreaks
of infection, their use does not eliminate the risk of transmission. See R. RICHARDS, supra note
26, at 84-85; The New Scarlet Letter, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982, at 62, 66; see also GENITAL HERPES-
Q AND A, supra note 27, at 3 ("no information" whether prophylactics prevent spread of
genital herpes); Questions From Our Readers, HELPER, Mar. 1982, at 8, 8-9 (discussing experi-
ments on effectiveness of condoms as barriers to herpes virus).
42 R. HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 89.
43 An ointment, acyclovir, speeds the healing of herpes sores in an initial attack, but
does not eradicate the virus. See Boffey, Broad Gains Are Reported In Research on Herpes, N.Y.
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promise, further testing and research appear necessary. 44 Moreover, if a
successful vaccine is developed, it may not combat the differing strains
of the virus 45 or cure victims already afflicted with the disease.46
There may also be long-term physical consequences of genital
herpes. Studies indicate that genital herpes infections may predispose
women to cervical cancer.47 Other complications of genital herpes in
men and women include neuralgia and meningitis.48
The psychological trauma associated with genital herpes is often as
debilitating as the physical consequences of the disease. Extreme de-
pression, marital conflicts, and the disruption of social and sexual rela-
tionships are common.49 According to one study, herpes victims "often
pass from shock and denial through loneliness, anger, fear, self-imposed
isolation and, finally, a deepening depression and a sense of entrapment
similar to the hopelessness often felt by patients with chronic diseases
like multiple sclerosis." 50 The social stigma associated with genital
Times, July 10, 1984, at Cl, col. 4 ("[c]ure [r]emains [e]lusive"). In contrast, syphilis and
gonorrhea can usually be cured with antibiotics and penicillin.
44 Spear, Problems with Developing an HSV Vaccine, HELPER, June 1982, at 9, 9 (discussing
reasons why development of herpes virus vaccine presents difficulties); Schmeck, A Herpes
Vaccine Eective in Mice, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (noting scientific hope that
research will lead to successful vaccine against genital herpes); Vaccine to Prevent Herpes Reported
in Britain, Wash. Post, June 14, 1983, at A13, col. 1 (testing and regulation of new vaccine
would take "several years").
45 Vaccine to Prevent Herpes Reported in Britain, supra note 44, at A13, col. 1.
Because numerous genetically different strains of herpes simplex virus exist, an individ-
ual can become infected with more than one strain. Raab & Lorincz, Herpes Dating Services, in
Letters, 250 J. A.M.A. 728 (1983). Thus, sex between two sufferers of genital herpes is not risk
free; victims can acquire new infections from each other, "with a possible increased recur-
rence rate." Id.; see also Corey, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing concept of reinfection).
46 Vaccine to Prevent Herpes Reported in Britain, supra note 44, at A13, col. 1.
47 These studies are not conclusive, however. D. BARLOW, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASES: THE FACTS 68 (1979) ("no certain association"); Callahan, The Herpes Epidemic,
NEW TIMEs, June 12, 1978, at 51-52 (citing studies of doctors from Emory University School
of Medicine and The Johns Hopkins University, but noting that "connection between herpes
and cancer is still tenuous"); Leff, Vis Time Bombs, MED. WORLD NEWS, May 12, 1980, at 68
(speculated link); Nahmias & Roizman, Infection with Herpes--Simplex Viruses I and 2 (Part 2),
289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 719, 722 (1973) (causal role of virus in cervical cancer "remains to be
proved"). But see Herpes: The VD of the '86s, supra note 23, at 75 ("incidence of cervical cancer
is four times higher among women with herpes than . . . those free of the disease"); Rapp,
Herpesviruses, Venereal Disease, and Cancer, 66 AM. ScIENTIST at 670, 673 (1978) ("women with
cervical cancer almost invariably have been exposed to herpes simplex virus prior to tumor
development').
48 Nahmias & Hutton, supra note 26, at 306.
49 Herpes.- The VD of the '86s, supra note 23, at 76 (survey indicating that "[a] quarter of
herpes victims felt destructive rage"; 18% felt the disease contributed to dissolution of mar-
riage or longterm relationship); McClintock, Love's Labor's Cost, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1982, at 145,
152 (quoting results of survey of herpes victims: 84% often depressed about disease; 40%
suffered such loss of self-esteem that it affected their work; 35% experienced impotence or
diminished sex drive); The Misery of Herpes I, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1980, at 105 ("frustration
of herpes victims pervades their whole lives"); Rovner, supra note 36, at C5, col. 1 (noting
shock, resentment and loss of self-esteem among victims of genital herpes).
50 Laskin, The Herpes Syndrome, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 94 (quot-
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herpes prompted one popular news magazine to label the disease the
"new scarlet letter." 5 1
The greatest risks of genital herpes, however, are associated with
childbirth. Women suffering from genital herpes have a greater likeli-
hood of spontaneous miscarriage or premature delivery. 52 A child deliv-
ered through a birth canal during an outbreak of genital herpes is
estimated to have a fifty percent chance of being infected. 53 Complica-
tions may include severe infection of the newborn's liver, kidneys, lungs,
brain, and other vital organs.5 4 The mortality rate among babies in-
fected with herpes is estimated to be as high as fifty percent;5 5 of the
survivors, many will suffer serious mental or physical impairment.5 6
Where an outbreak occurs or the possibility of an undetected outbreak
exists, the recommended procedure to protect the child is delivery by
cesarean section. 57
Genital herpes is a chronic and lifelong disease. It is spreading rap-
idly in the United States. Because the disease poses a grave health haz-
ard to the population, the public good requires steps to curtail its
transmission. The prospect of potential legal liability for the transmis-
sion of genital herpes should encourage sexual partners to act more
responsibly and, thereby, limit the spread of the disease.
ing Gillespie-Luby medical study); see a/so The New Scarlet Letter, supra note 41, at 64 (quoting
psychiatrist's findings of a "leper" effect as some patients relate "convictions of their own
ugliness, contamination or even dangerousness").
51 The New Scarlet Letter, supra note 41, at 62.
52 HERPES GENITAL INFECTION, supra note 32, at 3.
53 Cohn, 4 -Minute Testfor Herpes Developed by NIH Scientists, Wash. Post, July 15, 1983,
at A4, col. 2; see also W. WICKETT, supra note 23, at 181 (40% to 60% chance of infant
infection).
54 R. HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 99.
55 W. WICKETT-, supra note 23, at 36-37, 181 (half will suffer serious brain damage or
die); Wiesner & Parra, supra note 18, at 410 (half may die in neo-natal period); Cohn, supra
note 53, at A4, col. 2.
56 Wiesner & Parra, supra note 18, at 410.
A recent study in King County, Washington, demonstrates the increased incidence of
herpes infection among newborns. The rate of infection increased from 2.6 per 100,000 live
births to King County residents in the years 1966-69 to 28.2 per 100,000 in 1982. Sullivan-
Bolyai, Hull, Wilson & Corey, Neonatal Herpes Simplex Virus Infection in King County, Washington,
250 J. A.M.A. 3059, 3060 (1983).
Children infected at birth who survive may confront social rejection due to fears aroused
by their disease. Confusion over Infant Herpes, TIME, Jan. 16, 1984, at 73, 73.
57 D. BARLOW, supra note 47, at 68; W. WICKETT, supra note 23, at 37. But see Binkin &
Alexander, Neonatal Herpes: How Can It Be Prevented?, 250 J. A.M.A. 3094, 3095 (1983) (in
some instances, risks and costs of cesarean delivery outweigh benefits); Managing Recurrent
Herpes, supra note 27, at 10 (quoting head of maternal-fetal medicine at George Washington
University that cesarean delivery is "not a complete guarantee" of herpes-free birth). For a
recent discussion of delivery by women with genital herpes, see Harger, Pazin, Armstrong,
Breinig & Ho, Characteristics and Management of Pregnancy in Women with Genital Herpes Simplex
Viu Infection, 145 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 784 (1983).
[Vol. 70: 101
1984] TRANSMISSION OF DISEASE
II
RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION
Tort law has been characterized as a "social mediator"58 that bal-
ances the conflicting interests of individuals in order to achieve a "desir-
able social result."'59 Thus, courts must continually develop tort law in
accordance with changes in social policy. In this evolutionary process,
courts consider certain general objectives in determining whether to im-
pose tort liability: punishment of wrongdoers, deterrence of wrongful
conduct, compensation of the victim, and the implementation of "soci-
ety's shared notions of fairness."160 In addition, a court must consider
whether, in imposing liability, it can promulgate rules that are adminis-
tratively feasible.61
This Note reviews the law of torts to determine whether imposing
legal liability for the sexual transmission of genital herpes is appropriate.
The Note evaluates the issue of liability in the context of the fundamen-
tal objectives of tort law and the current trends in the evolution of tort
liability. In the past, courts have applied one or more of three causes of
action-negligence, battery, and misrepresentation-to the sexual trans-
mission of venereal disease.62 By using established precedent as a frame-
58 M. SHAPO, THE DuTY TO ACTr xi (1977).
59 The phrase is Dean Prosser's who has described the law of torts as a "battleground of
social theory." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 14-15 (4th ed. 1971).
Given the importance of the common law system of precedent, Dean Prosser contends that
"[t]here is good reason. . . to make a conscious effort to direct the law along lines which will
achieve a desirable social result." Id. § 3, at 15. Prosser has also labeled tort law as an exer-
cise in "social engineering." Id § 3, at 14-16.
60 J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 33-35 (2d ed. 1981). Other
torts scholars have enunciated similar objectives of tort liability. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 4 (moral aspect of defendant's conduct, historical development, convenience of
administration, capacity to bear loss, prevention and punishment); Williams, The Aimns of the
Law of TorLs, 4 CURR. LEGAL PROBLEMS 137 (1951) (appeasement, justice, deterrence, com-
pensation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (compensation, determination
of rights, vindication of parties, punishment of wrongdoers, deterrence of wrongful conduct).
See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 11.5, at 743 (1956) (proposed
solutions "must on the whole satisfy the ethical or moral sense of the community, its feeling of
what is fair and just.') (footnote omitted). On the question of "fairness," see Fletcher, Fairness
and Utiliy in Tort Theoq,, 85 HARV. L.REv. 537, 540-43 (1972) (using paradigms of reasonable-
ness and reciprocity to evaluate whether judges should look only at interests of parties before
the court or resolve "seemingly private disputes" in order to serve interests of entire
community).
61 For example, most courts in the past refused to allow recovery in cases involving
mental distress from shock or fright where no physical impact occurred. The courts feared an
onslaught of fraudulent claims. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W.
497, 501 (1935); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896).
For a discussion of the recent trend to allow such recovery, see infra note 79.
62 See infra notes 113, 143-44, 155-56, 205 and accompanying text. Venereal diseases are
infections transmitted from one person to another "by and during sexual intercourse or con-
tact." R. MORTON, VENEREAL DISEASES 17 (2d ed. 1972). In this Note, "venereal disease" is
used interchangeably with "sexually transmitted disease." See id. at 18 ("no division in the
medical mind between venereal and sexually transmitted diseases").
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work for liability in genital herpes cases, this Note proposes theories of
liability that courts can adopt without departing from traditional no-
tions of tort law. The Note concludes that imposition of tort liability
represents an effective means to help arrest the spread of genital herpes.
By imposing liability, courts would reaffirm the basic principle that
"[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society."'63
A. Negligence: Duty in the Sexual Relationship
Negligence has been defined as conduct that "falls below the stan-
dard established by law for the protection of others against unreason-
able risk of harm. '64 The extent of liability for negligence is one of tort
law's "perennial controversies. '6 5 According to the standard formula-
tion, the elements of a negligence cause of action include: a legal duty
on the part of the actor to conform to a standard of conduct for the
protection of others; a breach of that duty; a reasonable causal connec-
tion between the actor's conduct and the consequent injury; and dam-
age or actual loss to the injured party.66
The threshold question is whether a person has a legal duty to pro-
tect against the transmission of genital herpes.6 7 Duty, a legally imposed
obligation that arises from some relationship between the parties, re-
quires one party to conform to a particular standard of conduct for the
benefit of another. 68 The term "duty" is merely a label, however, that
casts no light on whether liability should be imposed. 69 There is no uni-
versally accepted test for determining the existence of a duty; courts bal-
ance a variety of considerations. These factors include history, concepts
of morality and justice, the convenience of the rule's administration, and
social perceptions as to where loss should properly fall. 70 Duty is a flexi-
63 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
65 R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 8 (1969).
66 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 3.03 (B. Lindahl rev.
ed. 1982); W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 30, at 143-44; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281 (1965).
67 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (1928)
(quoting McSherry, C.J., in West Va. Central & P. Ry. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 669,
671-72 (1903) (" 'In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of
the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of
which [duty] would have averted or avoided the injury.' ")).
68 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4
(1965); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, Part , 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1022-26
(1928); Winfield, Duty in Tortios Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 41, 41-43 (1934).
69 See, e.g., Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REv. 77, 77 (1961) (duty but a
conclusion after consideration of policies and factors); see also Waugh v. University of Hawaii,
63 Hawaii 117, 135, 621 P.2d 957, 970 (1980) (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 53, at
325-26: " 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection').
70 See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
[Vol. 70: 101
1984] TRANSMISSION OF DISEASE
ble concept conducive to judicial reinterpretation and modernization. 71
Therefore, court-created rules of duty72 reflect "the mores of the com-
munity" at the time of decision. 73
After recognizing a duty to protect against the transmission of geni-
tal herpes, courts must define the standard of conduct necessary to fulfill
the duty. In negligence cases, courts use an objective standard of rea-
sonableness, exemplified by the hypothetical reasonable man.74 Under
this standard, a person is liable in negligence if he knew or should have
known facts that would cause a reasonable person to recognize that an
Rptr. 468,471(1975); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 184, 77 N.W.2d 397,
402 (1956) (both citing Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953)); see also 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, § 18.6, at 1052 (before duty is imposed, courts must
balance plaintiff's and defendant's respective burdens, risks, and insurability). Professor Leon
Green has suggested five factors as determinants of duty: administrative, ethical (moral),
economic, prophylactic, and justice. Green, supra note 68, at 1033-34.
71 The concept of duty is a relatively recent innovation. At early English common law,
a defendant was responsible for the damage he inflicted whether or not he owed a "duty" to
the injured person. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 53; Note, The Death ofPasgraf A Comment on
the Current Status of the Duty Concept in California, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 793, 794 (1979); see also
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734-35, 441 P.2d 912, 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76-77 (1968)
(feudal society one of strict liability).
When negligence emerged as an independent tort in the 1800s, courts developed the
concept of duty which, if absent, would preclude liability. See Winfield, supra note 68, at 51-
58 (analyzing development of duty as requisite for negligence liability). For an early articula-
tion of the duty concept, see Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503, 508 (Brett, M.R.,
concurring).
A pro-defendant bias attributed to the need to limit the liabilities of the new, expanding
industrial sector was incorporated into the concept of duty in the 1800s. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 59, § 53, at 325; Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part I- The InAgbence of Environment, 64
W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1961); Sulnick, A Political Perspective of Tort Law, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 410,
415 (1974); see also Cooperrider, A Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1311
(1958) (commenting on unwillingness demonstrated by "judges of an earlier day" to expand
coverage of tort law).
For a discussion of the development of fault as a "coextensive element" of duty during
this period, see Note, The Modem Concept of Duty." Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School
District and School District Liability for Injuries to Truants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1893, 1904-05 &
1904 n.91 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Modem Concept of Duty].
Courts have only recently incorporated social considerations into the concept of duty,
thus showing sensitivity to victim injuries. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 4; see also Franklin,
Replacing the Negligence Lottery. Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 786
(1967) ("trend against fixed rules of law that facilitate[d] directed verdicts for the defendant
[to] a more flexible and victim-oriented interpretation of personal injury law"); Horvitz, Jus-
tice Tobdner's Tort Decisions: A Reaffnation of the Common Law Process, 29 HASTINGS LJ. 167,
168-70 (1977) (judicial focus on plaintiff injury); Note, The Modem Concept of Duty, supra, at
1906-07.
72 See, e.g., Green, supra note 71, at 1 ("expansion of tort law is the product of the courts
with minor assistance of legislatures').
73 Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953); see also 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 60, at xxvii ("common law of torts. . . accommodate[s] itself to the chang-
ing thought and action of the times').
74 W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283
(1965).
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unreasonable risk of harm exists. 75 Using this standard as a basis for
defining the appropriate conduct in genital herpes cases, this Note con-
tends that courts should impose an obligation to disclose infection upon
all persons who either know or should know that they are infected with
genital herpes.
Once a court recognizes the existence of a duty to protect against
the transmission of genital herpes and defines the conduct required to
satisfy the duty, it can determine whether the facts of a particular case
satisfy the final three elements of negligence liability. A plaintiff can
show breach of duty by proving that the defendant did not comply with
the standard of conduct required by the court. Because genital herpes is
sexually transmitted, a plaintiff can demonstrate the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury, thereby satisfy-
ing the causation requirement. 76 Physical pain and suffering associated
with contracting genital herpes, the emotional trauma, and the pros-
pects of long-term complications constitute actual damage. 77 Further-
more, this Note contends that the defense of assumption of the risk is
inapplicable to cases for the transmission of genital herpes. 78
1. Establishing the Duty
Common law redefinition of the concept of duty has led to the ex-
pansion of liability in negligence. Contemporary case law provides two
prominent examples of this broader scope of duty-the imposition of
liability for the negligent infliction of mental distress, 79 and the relaxa-
75 The actor, as a reasonable man, should realize that his act involves an unrea-
sonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, if a reasonable
man knowing so much of the circumstances surrounding the actor at the time
of his act as the actor knows or should know, would realize the existence of the
risk and its unreasonable character.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284, comment a (1965).
76 Problems of proof, however, may be substantial. Individuals whose sexual activity is
not limited to one partner may be unable to demonstrate that this particular party was re-
sponsible for transmitting genital herpes. See Galante, Herpes Victim Wins an Appeal, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 6, 1984, at 40, col. 3 (quoting head of nationwide herpes study) (because some sufferers
do not display symptoms, "it's . . . difficult to prove who got it from whom and when").
Because the usual incubation period for genital herpes is two to ten days, however, many
plaintiffs should be able to trace the disease back to the source of the infection. See supra note
29 and accompanying text. Moreover, plaintiffs who have been infected and can demon-
strate fidelity to one partner should not confront evidentiary difficulties.
As this Note only addresses liability between sexual partners and not third-party liabil-
ity, proximate cause is not an issue. Assume, however, the situation where .4 communicates
genital herpes to B and B then infects C. A's act is the actual cause of Cs injury. Whether 4's
sexual act is the proximate cause of Cs injury will be a question of law for the court to
determine. Cf. Livingston v. Gribetz, 549 F. Supp. 238, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (negligence
action will not lie for nonsexual transmission of herpes where proximate cause absent).
77 See supra notes 26-32 & 47-57 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
79 At common law, there was no duty to protect another from negligently inflicted
mental distress. Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery Without Loss ofJug Control, 11
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tion of landowner immunities.80 The desire to prevent injury, to ade-
quately compensate victims, and to impose greater responsibility on
potential defendants are underlying themes in recent decisions ex-
tending the scope of duty.8' Yet this liberalization of the duty concept
HOFSTRA L. REv. 937, 942 (1983); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 54 (general discussion
of mental distress). Courts barred recovery for fright unless the victim had some physical
contact with a person or object. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
This traditional rule has been relaxed to allow recovery for the physical consequences of
mental distress if the plaintiff is within a designated "zone of danger," even if no contact has
occurred. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Battalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). Subsequently, in Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), the California Supreme Court established
a cause of action for mental distress on behalf of a mother who, although outside the "zone of
danger" and not suffering any physical impact, had witnessed the defendant driver negli-
gently hit and kill her daughter. Id at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The court
described the traditional concept of duty as a "legal device. . . designed to curtail the feared
propensities ofjuries toward liberal awards," id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76,
and then rejected the two fears underlying the heretofore limited concept of duty: the fears of
fraudulent claims and of indefinable liability. Id. at 736-39, 441 P.2d at 917-20, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 77-80. Finding these fears unjustified, the court dismissed as "artificial abstractions" the
holdings that injury situs precludes duty. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85;
accordCorso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404
A.2d 672 (1979). See generally Note, Negligent Ingction of Emotional Distress in Accident Cases-The
Expanding Defiition ofLiabilioy-Dziokonski v. Babineau, 1 W. NFw ENG. L. REv. 795, 795-
801 (1979).
80 In Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), the
California Supreme Court concluded that the common law categories of trespasser, invitee,
and licensee did not reflect the primary considerations of whether immunity should be
granted to the landowner. Id at 116-17, 443 P.2d at 566-67, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03. The
court held that considering the status of the injured party to determine whether the land-
owner has a duty of care was "contrary to. . . modern social mores and humanitarian val-
ues," id. at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104, and further stated that the common law
rules "obscured . . . the proper considerations which should govern determination of...
duty." Id. The court then concluded that the common law status classifications should be
replaced with a single standard of reasonable care. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr.
at 104.
Other jurisdictions have also discarded the common law status categories. See, e.g., Mile
High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d
233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). Some courts have abolished the legal distinc-
tions between invitees and licensees but have retained the common law with respect to tres-
passers. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
81 Justice Tobriner, who authored the Dillon opinion, has stated that the concept of duty
has become "a shorthand statement that one party must recompense another for the loss."
Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TRIAL LAw. J. 17, 21 (1970);
see also Note, The Modem Concept of Duty, supra note 71, at 1906-11 (evolving concept of duty
enabled California Supreme Court to consider variety of socio-economic interests).
The ramifications of the broader scope of negligence liability extend far beyond the
landmark opinions in Dillon and Rowland and their progeny. See generally Fischer, supra note
79. Courts have extended liability in other areas as well, often altering long-standing com-
mon law principles. Some courts have discarded the common law rule that bars recovery for
negligently inflicted pure pecuniary loss. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598
P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (negligent loss of expected economic advantage actiona-
ble). In addition, courts have recognized new causes of action. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (wrongful birth).
Courts have also been narrowing or eliminating common law immunities. See, e.g., in/fa
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does not guarantee that courts will impose liability for the transmission
of genital herpes.
Whether an individual afflicted with genital herpes owes a duty of
care to his sexual partner to protect against the sexual transmission of
disease will depend on judicial evaluation. To some courts, foreseeabil-
ity of injury is the critical factor in defining duty;82 that is, the defend-
ant owes the plaintiff a duty of care if he could have reasonably foreseen
that his actions might injure the plaintiff.8 3 Although the primacy of
foreseeability as a determinant is not universally accepted,8 4 it has
gained substantial support in contemporary analysis.8 5
With foreseeability as the standard, the duty threshold in genital
herpes cases is readily met. It is foreseeable that an individual, who
either knows or, upon the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known that he is suffering from genital herpes, may infect his partner.8 6
Indeed, during periods of an initial or recurrent outbreak, the likelihood
of such transmission is so high that medical authorities recommend sex-
notes 191-200 and accompanying text (family); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446
S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969) (charities); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384,
388 A.2d 709 (1978) (governmental units). In lieu of the older decisional rule of contributory
negligence as a complete bar, there has been a marked shift to comparative negligence. See
Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisi-
ana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299, 317 (1980) (more than two-thirds of states have repudiated contribu-
tory negligence and have some form of comparative fault).
82 See, e.g., Smith v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 699 F.2d 1043, 1045 (11 th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that, under Tennessee law, existence of duty depends on whether "reasonably prudent
person would foresee that his . . . conduct might endanger the plaintiff"); Frankovitch v.
Burton, 185 Conn. 14, 20, 440 A.2d 254, 259 (1981) (test of duty found in foreseeability);
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 406, 591 P.2d 719, 722 (1979) (general rule that
"scope of the duty owed is governed by the concept of 'foreseeability' "); see also Robertson v.
LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 567 (W. Va. 1983) (listing jurisdictions applying foreseeability as
primary determinant).
83 See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, § 18.2 (detailing foreseeability
limitation on duty of care).
84 Professor Leon Green criticized the use of foreseeability as a determinant of duty
more than 50 years ago. He argued that it would illogically provide the judge with the same
standard to determine whether a duty existed as it gives to the trier of fact for determining
whether a duty was violated. Green, supra note 68, at 1029-30.
85 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, § 18.2, at 1018 ("Duty... is measured
by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.") (footnote omitted). See
generally Murphy, Evolution of the Duy of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REv. 147 (1980)
(trend in tort law toward generalized rule of duty defined by foreseeability).
California became a primary proponent of the foreseeability doctrine in a series of
landmark decisions. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d
334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) (duty of care owed to anyone foresecably endangered
by defendant's conduct); Weirum v. RKO Gen., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975) (foreseeability of risk "primary consideration" in establishing duty);
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968) (in decid-
ing whether defendant owed duty to plaintiff, "chief element" is foreseeability of risk).
86 Not every individual infected knows or, upon the exercise of reasonable care, should
know he is infected. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ual abstinence. 87 Moreover, because virtually all victims of genital
herpes contract the disease during sexual activity, they should be cogni-
zant of the manner of transmission.88 Thus, the likelihood of harm aris-
ing from such sexual activities is recognizable.
Yet, not all injuries should be actionable.8 9 Although the foresee-
ability test will identify reasonably expected injuries, it does not indicate
whether policy values support the compensation of victims of genital
herpes through legal action. Any expansion of duty should reflect con-
siderations of public welfare, not merely foresight.90
An alternative method to determine whether a duty should exist is
a balancing approach. This approach accommodates considerations of
public welfare better than relying solely on foreseeability. Some courts
that engage in balancing enunciate a general, often vague, framework,9'
while others explicitly detail disparate variables.92 Appropriate factors
to consider in balancing the burden of a duty against the social benefits
of liability can be categorized as preventive, compensatory, moral and
administrative. 93 Whether a duty exists depends on the weight the
courts assign to these factors.
a. Elements in the Balance. (i) Preventive. One argument for estab-
lishing a duty is the recognized state interest in the prevention and con-
87 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 27. A survey of patients with genital herpes found that 95% of those
who knew how they acquired the disease indicated that transmission occurred during sexual
relations. Bierman, supra note 36, at 3. In Bierman's survey, however, a sizeable minority of
patients were unable to identify how they acquired the infection. Id. 25.4% of the respon-
dents replied that they had "knowingly" infected their sexual partners. Id.
89 See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 4, at 18. Henderson, Expanding the Negigence Concept:
Retreat.from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. LJ. 467, 514-15 (1976).
90 Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1418 (1961) ("[I]t is
always hindsight that must be relied on for judgment-hindsight that may call into play far-
flung considerations affecting the welfare of persons not parties to the litigation, for 'we the
people' have a stake in every litigation and our interests can not be ignored.") (emphasis in
original).
91 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, 460, 565 P.2d 1315, 1321 (Ct. App.
1977) (determination of duty dependent on "multitude of policy considerations"); Robertson
v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 568 (W. Va. 1983) ("[C]onsiderations include the likelihood of
injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing
that burden on the defendant.").
92 See, e.g., Wright v. Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 278, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812,
814-15 (1964) (citing Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31
Cal. Rptr. 847, 851-52 (1963) (factors that lead to imposing duty of care include social utility
of activity out of which injury arises, feasibility of rule of care, relative liability of parties to
assume economic cost of injury, statutes and judicial precedents moral imperatives)).
93 Several courts have divided policy issues into similar categories. See, e.g., Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310-15, 379 P.2d 513, 522-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33,
42-45 (1963) (administrative, socio-economic, moral); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978) (moral, administrative, eco-
nomic, preventative); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 652, 338 A.2d 524, 528 (1975)
(moral, economic, administrative).
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trol of contagious disease.9 4 Numerous states have enacted statutes that
make the communication of venereal disease a crime.9 5 Furthermore,
94 See, e.g., Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 325, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919) (noting that
health of citizenry is an "economic asset" of state and assurance of good health a "matter of
[state] importance"); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996, 198 Cal. Rptr.
273, 276 (1984) (noting interest of state in preventing and controlling "contagious and dan-gerous diseases"); see aso Sexual
, 
Transmitted Disease Control, PUB. HEALTH REP. 49, 52-55
(Supp. to Sept.-Oct. 1983 issue) (listing federal government priority objectives in combatting
venereal diseases).
95 E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-16-17 (1977) (misdemeanor); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-4-401(2),
-407 (1982) (misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 701, 709 (1983) (fine up to $1,000 or
imprisonment up to one year, or both); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 384.01, .03 (West 1973) (misde-
meanor); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-601, -607 (1977) (misdemeanor); NEv. REV. STAT. § 441.290
(1981) (misdemeanor); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1977) (misdemeanor);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-519 (West 1984) (felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (Supp.
1983) (misdemeanor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1106 (1982) (fine up to $500, or imprison-
ment up to two years, or both); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.24.010, .080 (1975) (gross
misdemeanor). Pursuant to several of these statutes, the mere exposure of another to venereal
disease constitutes a misdemeanor. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-401(2) (1982) (misde-
meanor to "willfully expose"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 441.290 (1981) (misdemeanor to "know-
ingly expos[e]"); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-60, -140 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (misdemeanor to
"expose another"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23-1 (1977) (same); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 68-10-107, -111 (1983) (same).
When a statute prohibits certain acts, a court may look to the statute for the standard of
conduct that members of the community should follow. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 36.
The court is under no compulsion to adopt the criminal standard in civil cases, but it may
consider the legislation as an official determination that certain risks are foreseeable, and thus
certain conduct is prohibited-and that no reasonable man would violate the prohibition. See
generally Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 21, 21
(1949) (evaluating "appropriateness of using criminal proscriptions as a measure of fault and
care in negligence cases"). The majority position is that the violation of a statute enacted for
the protection of the public is negligence per se. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 60,
at 388-89; see, e.g., Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 240, 596 P.2d 460, 464 (1979);
Bayne v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 917, 918-19, 568 P.2d 771, 772 (1977); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965). Other courts find the violation to be
only evidence of negligence. See, e.g., Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Co., 197 Ark. 425, 431,
122 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1938) (violation of state law merely evidence of negligence).
Certain threshold requirements must be met before courts apply these venereal disease
statutes to suits involving sexual transmission of genital herpes. The RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS summarizes these as follows: the statute must be directed to "protect a class
of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded"; "protect the particular interest
which is invaded;" "protect that interest against the kind of harm [that] resulted;" and "pro-
tect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
The venereal disease statutes protect the community from the effects of sexually trans-
mitted diseases by protecting the bodily integrity of those engaged in sexual relationships.
The statutory language also reflects an intent to curtail the spread of such contagion. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-519 (West 1984) (felony to marry or to expose another to
venereal disease or to "liability to contract the same"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (Supp.
1983) (willful introduction of communicable disease into any community is misdemeanor).
Although these goals parallel those found in the genital herpes suits, the definition of
venereal disease in virtually all state statutes does not include genital herpes. Several statutes
define venereal disease to include only syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 701 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.01 (West 1973); IDAHO CODE § 39-
601 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061 (West 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-60 (Law.
Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23-1 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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courts have taken judicial notice of the government's efforts to eradicate
sexually transmitted diseases.9 6 The health risks to the victim,9 7 the
threat to newborns,98 and the unprecedented increase in the number of
those infected with genital herpes during the past two decades99 argue
for a corrective response. Society can discourage the spread of genital
herpes by placing a "mark of legal disapproval"100 on transmission of
the disease. As people become aware of these adjudications, sexual ac-
tivity in situations where the transmission of genital herpes to an un-
knowing partner is a possible result should decrease.
(ii) Compensatory. In addition to the societal concern for prevention,
there is concern for the injured plaintiff. The trend in modern tort law
reflects a victim-oriented approach with compensation as a fundamen-
tal, if not primary, goal. 1' 1 In genital herpes cases, the plaintiff has ac-
quired an incurable disease. The victim confronts a prospect of lifelong
§ 70.24.010 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 16-4-1 (1979). Other states add granuloma inguinale and
lymphogranuloma venereum to the category. Eg., AtA. CODE § 22-16-1 (1977); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-4-40(1) (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-1 (1979). In some states a designated state
authority has authority to add to the list of venereal diseases. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAw § 2311 (McKinney Supp. 1983) (Comm'r of Health); OR. REV. STAT. § 434.005(3)
(1981) (Health Div. of State Dep't of Human Resources); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1091
(1982) (Dep't of Health). Certain jurisdictions include "catchall" language. Eg., NEv. REV.
STAT. § 441.050 (1981) ("or any other disease which can be sexually transmitted"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-10-101 (1983) ("other venereal diseases"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-517
(West 1984) ("any other disease which may be transmitted from any person to any other
person [by] sexual intercourse and found and declared by medical science or accredited
schools of medicine to be infectious or contagious"). Courts could read this broad language to
include genital herpes, but such vague descriptions do not provide adequate notice of a rele-
vant standard of care.
Statutes that refer simply to the transmission of a contagious disease are also ambiguous.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3353 (West 1979) ("any person afflicted with any
contagious, infectious, or communicable disease who wilfully exposes himself. . . is guilty of
a misdemeanor"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.31, .32 (West 1972) ("[a]ny person who knowingly
exposes another to infection from any communicable disease" guilty of a misdemeanor).
Moreover, courts may view statutes that have not been enforced for a considerable time
as obsolete and refuse to apply them in cases of civil liability for the transmission of genital
herpes. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 36, at 200 (discussing "troublesome" problem of
"obsolete" legislation).
Texas has recently revised its venereal disease law. Texas Gets Tough Law on Transmitting
S)philis, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at A12, col. 6. The new statute includes genital herpes in
the definition of venereal disease, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4445d, § 1.03 (Vernon
Supp. 1984), but excludes the transmitter of genital herpes from criminal sanctions. Under
the revision it is a misdemeanor to "knowingly" expose another to infection with a "reporta-
ble" venereal disease. Id. § 6.01. The statute, however, only includes syphilis and gonorrhea
in the category of reportable venereal diseases although it gives the Texas Board of Health the
authority to adopt rules adding other venereal diseases to this category. Id. § 2.01.
96 Se, e.g., Exparte Fowler, 85 Okla. Crim. 64, 74, 184 P.2d 814, 819 (1947) ("matter of
common knowledge").
97 See supra notes 26-32, 47-51 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
100 R. KELTON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 153 (1969).
101 See supra notes 71 & 79-81 and accompanying text; see also Green, The Duty Problem in
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recurrences and accompanying emotional trauma. Although a mone-
tary damages award is not the equivalent of a restoration of health, it
can compensate medical expenses in full and emotional and physical
suffering in part.
(iii) Moral. The quality of the defendant's conduct further justifies
the recognition of a duty. The reasonable expectations of parties engag-
ing in sexual activity is that sex will be an emotionally rewarding experi-
ence, not a setting for the transmission of disease. Such an intimate
relationship is based on confidence and trust-that an individual aware
of his contagion would infect an unknowing partner introduces an ele-
ment of blameworthiness, of moral fault, that is a prominent factor in
establishing liability. 102 The law of torts has been described as satisfying
the "moral sense" of the community, its feeling of what is "fair and
just."' 0 3 To so callously disregard a sexual partner's well-being invites
social opprobrium and reprimand.10 4
(iv) Admznistrative. In determining whether an individual should be
liable for the sexual transmission of disease, the courts must consider
whether they can create rules that are administratively feasible. 105 With
an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 new genital herpes cases each year, a
multitude of suits might overwhelm court dockets. Yet several factors
indicate that the amount of new litigation will be manageable. If there
is a threat of liability, herpes carriers would probably exercise greater
care and awareness in sexual behavior, thereby reducing the frequency
of genital herpes transmission. In addition, the fear of trial publicity
may prompt many defendants to settle out-of-court. From the victim's
perspective, personal embarrassment associated with revealing one's sex-
ual activity may also militate against legal action. Furthermore, some
victims may be unwilling to jeopardize a relationship by seeking com-
pensation despite infection by their partners. Thus, factors exist that
will counterbalance any potential surge of herpes litigation.
b. Summaty. Considered together, the factors underlying duty sup-
port the imposition of liability for the sexual transmission of genital
herpes. The administrative costs of extending liability can be con-
trolled, whereas the compelling societal need to arrest the spread of this
disease, the serious injury sustained by the victim, and the moral fault of
Neghgence Cases: Part II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 256 (1929) ("the hurt plaintiff captures the
heart of judges . . .[t]his is justice").
102 See supra note 60; see also Green, supra note 101, at 255 (moral factor "most compelling
influence" on judges).
103 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, at 743.
104 See, e.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 525, 105 S.E. 206, 211 (1920), reh'g denied,
181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921) (Walker & Hoke, JJ., dissenting) ("not a word of condemna-
tion too severe to be applied to the conduct" of husband who infected his wife with
gonorrhea).
105 Green, supra note 68, at 1035-37 & 1044-45.
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one who conceals infection from a sexual partner justify extending the
protection of the legal system to the genital herpes victim. A duty in the
sexual relationship to protect against the transmission of genital herpes
to one's partner not only conforms to the reasonable expectations of the
parties but reinforces the societal goal of ensuring community well-be-
ing. Furthermore, the duty imposed should remain the same regardless
of the duration of the sexual relationship or the marital status of the
parties; for the injury caused by the transmission of genital herpes and
the threat to societal health is identical. Thus, the duty arises in the
context of any sexual activity where the transmission of genital herpes is
possible.
c. Case Law Precedent: Negligence Liability and Contagious Diseases.
The recognition of a duty to protect against the transmission of genital
herpes would not be a radical departure from earlier precedent. Al-
though previous venereal disease cases arose in battery,10 6 various courts
have articulated the principle that a person who negligently exposes an-
other to infectious disease should be liable for damages.107 These cases
involved the transmission of smallpox, 0 8 whooping cough, 0 9 and tuber-
culosis' 10 that, at the time, were either incurable or of grave health risk.
Although a majority of the decisions imposing liability for the
transmission of disease involved contractual settings that arguably es-
tablished a special relationship"' and a higher level of care, 112 some
courts have imposed liability for the transmission of disease in the nor-
mal course of daily activity.' '3 As one court stated, "[t]o be stricken with
106 See, e.g., State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917); Crowell v. Crow-
ell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), reh'g denied, 181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921); see infia
notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 475, 98 A.2d 107, 109 (1953) ("[t]he
degree of diligence required to prevent exposing another to a contagious or infectious disease
depends upon the character of the disease and the danger of communicating it to others")
(quoting 25 AM. JUR. Health § 45, at 318); seealsoJ. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, CLERK & LIND-
SELL ON TORTS § 10-45, at 423 (15th ed. 1982) (under English law "[not] settled whether a
person suffering from an infectious disease can be liable for its negligent communication," but
authors suggest that an action ought to lie).
108 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 23 N.W. 632 (1885); Franklin v. Butcher,
144 Mo. App. 660, 129 S.W. 428 (1910); Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W.
431 (1910).
109 See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1884).
11o See, e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953); see also Kliegel v.
Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 69 N.W. 67 (1896) (typhoid fever).
111 For a discussion of the special relationship concept, see generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 56, at 348-50; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965); McNiece &
Thornton, Aj#&mative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE LJ. 1272 (1949).
112 Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 23 N.W. 632 (1885) (guests in defendants' hotel
contracting disease from another guest whom defendants knew had smallpox); Earle v.
Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) (lessee of apartment in family home con-
tracting disease from owner of home); Kleigel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 69 N.W. 67 (1896)
(disease contracted while employed in infected household).
113 See, e.g., Franklin v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 660, 667, 129 S.W. 428,430 (1910) (victim
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disease through another's negligence is in legal contemplation as it often
is in the seriousness of consequences, no different from being struck with an
automobile through another's negligence." 1 4
2. Conduct Required to Meet the Duty of Care
In addition to recognizing the existence of a duty of care in the
sexual relationship, courts must also define the standard of conduct re-
quired to meet that duty.1 5 Only after the courts outline the conduct
required can they determine whether the defendant has complied with
that duty. If the defendant has not complied, he can be held liable in
negligence.
Reasonable expectations of sexual partners suggest that a herpes
sufferer would advise his sexual partner of the potential harm of infec-
tion and abstain from sexual activity during a primary attack or recur-
rence when the risk of communication is known. The epidemic
increase 16 of genital herpes, however, belies this expectation. Rather, it
appears that many individuals infected with genital herpes engage in
sexual risk-taking and conceal their disease, thereby depriving their
partners of the opportunity to make an informed decision.
Using the hypothetical reasonable man as a basis for defining the
appropriate standard of conduct,"i7 reasonable expectations suggest that
an individual with genital herpes has an obligation to inform his sexual
partner of his disease." 8 In Hendricks v. Butcher, 119 an early case involv-
walked with infected defendant and, on another occasion, met with infected defendant at
saloon).
In Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), reh'g denied, 181 N.C. 66, 106
S.E. 149 (1921), where a husband infected his wife with venereal disease, the court stated that
it was a "well settled proposition of law that a person is liable if he negligently exposes an-
other to a contagious or infectious disease." Id. at 519, 105 S.E. at 208. In Duke v. Housen,
589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), a woman suffering from gonorrhea brought suit against the man
that infected her. Although holding that the statute of limitations had run, the court stated
that one "who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, which such
other person thereby contracts, can be held liable in damages for his actions." Id. at 340.
114 Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 328 Pa. 97, 105, 195 A. 110, 114 (1937) (dicta) (emphasis
in original).
115 See Green, supra note 68, at 1025 (describing duty to use reasonable care as "pious
aphorism" that does not indicate what is specifically required).
116 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
118 One who has been diagnosed or is otherwise aware that he has the disease has no
excuse for failure to disclose based on lack of knowledge. Further, as the appropriate stan-
dard for evaluating the conduct of a defendant is that of the reasonable man, those who
should know that they have the affliction likewise have no excuse. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965). Some individuals who contract the disease, however, never
experience any symptoms and are unaware of their affliction. See supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text. In such cases, there could be no obligation to disclose and, therefore, liability for
the transmission of disease should not ensue.
An obligation to warn or disclose has often been loosely termed a "duty." Where, how-
ever, liability for failing to warn or disclose is imposed, it is because there is an underlying
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ing the transmission of smallpox, the court determined that once an in-
dividual is aware of his infection it is his duty to keep away from others,
but where contact occurs he is obligated to inform them of his disease
"so that they might protect themselves."' 120 In a recent decision involv-
ing a suit for damages caused by the transmission of genital herpes, a
California appellate court focused on the trust that is violated when one
partner in an intimate relationship conceals a "venereal or other dan-
gerous contagious disease."' 12 Warning one's sexual partner of the risk
of genital herpes transmission rather than concealing the infection elimi-
nates any "advantage-taking" that would exist if the partner remained
unaware of the potential harm.
Disclosure should not be limited to those periods when a herpes
sufferer realizes that he is contagious. A person who knows he has geni-
tal herpes may, during a recurrence, misjudge when he is contagious or,
if the symptoms are exceedingly mild, may be unaware of his contagious
state. This uncertainty requires that an individual suffering from geni-
tal herpes disclose his affliction before sexual activity whether or not he
believes he is currently contagious. Full disclosure at all times would per-
mit an informed choice in sexual activity, reinforce candor and honesty
in sexual decisions, and provide the greatest protection to the sufferer's
sexual partner. Courts will enhance societal well-being by defining the
duty in terms of a disclosure requirement. This obligation is likely to
reduce the number of casual sexual encounters, increase the use of pre-
ventive measures, and promote sexual abstinence during periods when
the risk of transmission is high. Because a failure to warn could result in
liability, an individual infected with genital herpes would display in-
creased care and concern for the welfare of sexual partners who might
be injured by his actions. These modifications in behavior should com-
bine to reduce the rate at which genital herpes is increasing. 122
duty to prevent harm to the injured party. McGeorge v. City of Phoenix, 117 Ariz. 272, 277-
78, 572 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Ct. App. 1977). The duty here is inferred from the positive act of
the sexual relationship; the duty does not arise from the omission of the warning or disclosure.
See also L. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 13-14 (1941).
The concept of an obligation to disclose is not foreign to tort law. See, e.g., Davis v.
Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 392, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (1921) (attending physician "owes a duty to
those who . . . are liable to be brought in contact with the patient" to inform them of dis-
ease); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976) (therapist's duty to potential victim of patient may include duty to warn); McIntosh v.
Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 484, 403 A.2d 500, 509 (Law Div. 1979) (physician has obliga-
tion to warn third persons against possible exposure to venereal disease); Obde v. Schlemeyer,
56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960) (vendor duty to disclose termite infestation); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, § 28.7, at 1547 (duty of manufacturer of a product to give
"reasonable warning or instructions for safe use").
119 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910).
120 Id. at 674, 129 S.W. at 432.
t21 Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984).
122 An analogy can be drawn between the obligation to disclose in genital herpes cases
and the principle of informed consent in the medical field. According to that principle, a
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Once courts determine that an obligation to disclose exists, they
must define the elements of an adequate disclosure. 123 Disclosure should
occur prior to the onset of sexual activity. The extent of the necessary
warning will depend on the specific facts and circumstances. 124 The so-
phistication of one's partner, his or her ability to comprehend the warn-
ing, and the timing of the disclosure are of critical significance. 125 At a
minimum, the warning must adequately indicate the scope of the dan-
ger and must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of harm
that could result from infection. Thus, between experienced sexual
partners, the mere statement that one has genital herpes should fulfill
the disclosure threshold. 126
But why an obligation to disclose and not an obligation by the
uninfected partner to inquire? To some degree, the obligation to dis-
close is troubling. An innocent victim of genital herpes now suffering
the physical and emotional trauma of this disease will be required to
reveal his or her affliction to others. Yet the personal embarrassment
and possible hurt of rejection that might accompany disclosure is a
much less significant cost than the transmission of genital herpes to an-
physician is not entitled to treat a patient unless the patient has consented to the treatment.
See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d
170, 181 (1957) ("[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability
if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment"). See generally Meisel, The Expansion of Liabilityfor Medical
Accidents. From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51
(1977).
123 One organization serving herpes sufferers has outlined a possible statement of disclo-
sure. McClintock, supra note 49, at 154 (quoting from THE HELPER, a publication for herpes
sufferers, which advises describing genital herpes as "an intermittent, self-limiting condition
that comes and goes"). The trauma that sufferers of genital herpes experience is implicit in
the advice never to use the words "incurable," "lesion," or "nightmare." Id.
124 The adequacy of the warning will usually be a question of fact. See, e.g., Formella v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 100 Mich. App. 649, 655, 300 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1980); Michael v.
Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (1978).
125 A detailed discussion of genital herpes by a layman might include inaccuracies that,
upon detrimental reliance by his sexual partner, could lead to liability in negligence. See, e.g.,
Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982). In Alice D.,
a woman relied on her lover's representation that he was sterile. The lover was mistaken and
impregnated the woman. The court held that the defendant owed an obligation to give accu-
rate information to his sexual partner:
[H]is representation of sterility, though made with an honest belief as to its
truth, constitutes negligence because of his lack of reasonable care in properly
ascertaining the true facts and informing the claimant as to them. . . . (cita-
tion omitted) The defendant had a duty to take further steps to ascertain the
truth regarding his condition . . . . He did not and this is the basis for im-
posing liability . ...
Id. at 946, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
126 One partner's disclosure of infection does not relieve an infected companion from
disclosing the fact that she is also infected. The multiple strains of the herpes virus create the
possibility for transmission of a different strain from one partner to another, resulting in more
frequent outbreaks. See Raab & Lorincz, supra note 45, at 728 (rejecting idea that "once
you've got it, further exposure doesn't make any difference").
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other unknowing partner. It is the herpes sufferer who exposes his part-
ner to the prospect of a harmful contact and, given the general
expectations of candor and a healthful sexual relationship, he should
bear the burden of disclosure.12 7 He knows of his disease and he is in the
best position to warn. Furthermore, disclosure may reinforce elements
of trust and sharing that can lead to longer, more supportive relation-
ships. Consequently, it is more efficient and appropriate to impose a
duty to disclose than an obligation to inquire.
3. Assumption of the Risk128
The final question a court must consider before imposing liability
for the transmission of genital herpes is whether those who engage in
sexual activity assume the risk of contracting this disease merely by con-
senting to such activity. Elements of the defense include the plaintiff's
understanding of and voluntary exposure to a risk in circumstances that
indicate a willingness to accept such risk.'2 9 At common law, a success-
ful assumption of the risk defense barred recovery. 130
When an individual infected with genital herpes accurately informs
his sexual partner of his affliction but the partner understands the risk
and voluntarily consents to sexual activity, the partner has expressly as-
sumed the risk of contracting genital herpes and no liability should en-
sue for its transmission. This affirms the freedom of independent choice
in sexual relations, allowing one to waive the right to be free from cer-
tain dangers.'13
The question remains, however, whether an individual's participa-
tion in sexual relations manifests an implied assumption of the risk when
he is unaware of a partner's infection. Arguably, the risk of contracting
genital herpes is a risk that all should appreciate in light of sex educa-
tion and widespread publicity. Therefore, an individual who consents
to sex may be regarded as having impliedly assumed the risk of con-
127 Inspection of one's sexual partner is not an effective safeguard against acquiring geni-
tal herpes. Contagious periods begin before sores appear. Furthermore, the sores may be
internal and not visible. See R. RICHARDS, supra note 26, at 84.
128 This Note treats assumption of the risk at this point because of its unique
applicability to negligence. For a general discussion of tort defenses, see infa notes 190-217
and accompanying text.
129 [A] plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself ... caused by
the defendant's conduct . . . and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to
enter or remain . . . within the area of that risk, under circumstances that
manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm within
that risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496B comment c (1965).
130 W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 68; Bohlen, Volunlay Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L.
REV. 14, 14 (1906).
131 See Bohlen, supra note 130, at 14.
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tracting herpes even though he is unaware of a partner's infection.13 2
On closer analysis, the argument favoring implied assumption of
the risk in marital relationships can be rejected as against reasonable
expectations. Premarital blood test requirements presume uninfected
contact between spouses. 133 Furthermore, many jurisdictions find a
spouse's infection with a venereal disease to be sufficiently grave to con-
stitute grounds for annulment or divorce.134 Because marriage generally
represents a willingness to procreate, 135 one does not contemplate that
sex with one's spouse may lead to genital herpes infection and the conse-
quent health risks to any child conceived of that union.
Public policy also argues against the application of implied as-
sumption of the risk to premarital or extramarital relationships. Society
has a fundamental interest in the well-being of its citizens and strives to
limit the harm that one individual permissibly can inflict upon an-
other.13 6 The magnitude of the societal health concerns associated with
genital herpes precludes resort to this doctrine as a complete defense.
Moreover, the community judgment expressed in states that have en-
acted legislation to make the transmission of venereal diseases a crime
should bear weight in civil actions. 13 7 Equally compelling is the reason-
able expectation of sexual partners that sexual activity will have physi-
cal and emotional rewards and will not be a setting for the transmission
of an incurable disease. 138
132 Implied assumption of the risk, however, involves a subjective standard-it concerns
what the particular plaintiff sees, knows, and understands. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496D comment c (1965); Kionka, Implied Assumption of the Risk." Does it Survive Com-
parativeFaullt, 1982 S. ILL. U.LJ. 371, 379. To some extent, a court may be willing to impute
common knowledge. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 68, at 448 ("the standard applied in
fact does not differ greatly from that of the reasonable man"). A plaintiff's failure to adhere
to an objective standard of care might constitute contributory negligence. See id. § 65.
133 H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.10
(1968); Note, Pre-Marital Testsfor Venereal Disease, 53 HARV. L. REv. 309, 310 (1939) (purpose
of premarital venereal disease test laws to prevent transmission of venereal disease to future
spouse and to prospective children); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-26 (West Supp.
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.051 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-9 (West Supp.
1984); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13-a (McKinney Supp. 1983).
134 Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1016 (1920).
135 See, e.g, Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 81, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (1926) (matter of public
policy that marriages are for purpose of producing offspring); Height v. Height, 18 Misc. 2d
1023, 1024, 187 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1959) (same).
136 See Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17, 42 (1961) (as to
physical harm, "there does not exist a sphere of individual interest where choice is sovereign
no matter how great the injury").
137 See supra note 95.
138 The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is in disfavor in a number ofjurisdic-
tions, see Kionka, supra note 132, at 372 n.9, either having been limited, see, e.g., Springrose v.
Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24-25, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971) (assumption of risk must be
apportioned under state's comparative negligence statute), or abolished, see, e.g., Meistrich v.
Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 NJ. 44, 54, 155 A.2d 90, 95-96 (1959) (assumption of risk a
"mere phase" of contributory negligence).
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B. Battery: The Sexual Transmission of Genital Herpes as an
Intentional Tort
Battery is the intentional, harmful or offensive, and unprivileged
contact with the person of another. 139 This tort offers an alternative
ground on which to impose liability for the transmission of genital
herpes. The sexual activity between partners satisfies the contact re-
quirement for a cause of action in battery. The physical pain and ill-
ness, recurrent outbreaks, and other complications associated with
genital herpes satisfy the requirement of harm.140 The degree of scienter
necessary to satisfy the "intent" requirement and the question of
whether consent to sexual activity establishes a privilege precluding lia-
bility, however, are less easily resolved issues.
1. Intent
Intent encompasses "not only ...those consequences which are
desired, but also . ..those which the actor believes are substantially
certain to follow from [his actions]." 14' Although instances where
herpes sufferers purposely seek to infect their sexual partners appear to
be rare,142 infected individuals with no desire to harm their sexual com-
panions may transmit the disease in a manner that fulfulls the standard
of intent.
In State v. Lankford,a14 3 a husband suffering from syphilis failed to
inform his wife of his affliction and infected her. The court inferred the
intent to communicate the disease from the "actual results" because of
the husband's failure to disclose his infection.144
Although this failure of the husband to disclose was sufficient for
the Lankfordcourt to find intent, many courts may be reluctant to infer
intent from the failure to disclose. As with syphilis and gonorrhea, t45
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 60, § 3.3.
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (1965) (bodily harm defined as "physical
impairment of the condition of another's body, or physical pain or illness"). See supra notes
27-39 and accompanying text. This Note does not address whether sexual activity between
an individual infected with genital herpes and an uninfected partner to whom the virus is not
transmitted constitutes an offensive contact within the meaning of the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 19 (1965) ("A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of
personal dignity.").
141 W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 8, at 31; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 8A comment b (1965); Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
142 But cf. Herpes: The VD of the '80s, supra note 23, at 76 (man recently infected with
genital herpes "so angry that he determined to infect as many women as he could").
143 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917).
144 Id. at 596, 102 A. at 64.
145 AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASS'N, CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES IN MAN
316 (A. Benenson 12th ed. 1975) (period of communicability of syphilis "[v]ariable and indefi-
nite"); see also J. CHIAPPA & J. FORISH, THE VD BOOK 20-21 (1976) (discussing variable
rates of gonorrhea transmission).
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the fact that a person has genital herpes does not ensure that he will
transmit the disease during each act of sexual intercourse. Medical au-
thorities advise those infected with genital herpes to abstain from sexual
relations only during periods of an initial outbreak or recurrence. 146
During these periods, an individual with genital herpes would recognize
that it is "substantially certain" that any sex partners will be infected
and he would possess the necessary degree of intent.
An infected party may, however, become contagious before discern-
ing a recurrence. From the time visible sores appear until they com-
pletely heal, the risk of transmission is high and known. 14 7 But the
disease may be transmitted during the onset of preliminary symptoms
prior to the reemergence of sores. 148 If these symptoms are mild, the
infected party may be unaware of the recurrence. Sexual activity in
these circumstances would be negligent, but would not constitute an in-
tentional wrong. Knowledge and appreciation of the risk of transmis-
sion, "short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent to intent." 49
This analysis presumes that the transmitter of genital herpes is
aware that he has the disease. To establish a cause of action in negli-
gence the infected party would have to show that the transmitter should
have known that he was infected.150 In contrast, to establish a cause of
action in battery she must show that the transmitter had actual knowl-
edge of his affliction.' 5' Where an individual has contracted genital
herpes but does not experience symptoms and, consequently, is unaware
of his condition, liability would not ensue.
The knowledge requirements that allow a court to infer intent im-
pose a significant limitation on the use of the cause of action in battery
to curtail the spread of genital herpes. During unrecognized contagious
periods, the element of intent is not satisfied even where genital herpes is
transmitted. If those with the disease are obliged to disclose based on a
duty of due care, however, the uninfected party has the opportunity to
make an informed choice whether to risk infection, an opportunity that
otherwise would be absent.
2. Consent
In the past, courts have held that a person who consents to sexual
activity may not maintain an action in battery against a sexual part-
146 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
148 Id.
149 W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 8, at 32.
150 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
151 See also Note, Torts-Mental Intent Requirement-Trespass and Negligence Compared, 34
ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 268, 271 (1962) (degree of certainty of harm that must be proven
under negligence "considerably less" than that required for intentional tort).
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ner.152 The general rule is that an individual who "effectively consents
to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in
an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it. ' ' 153
Courts have distinguished between the consent to sexual activity
and the consent to infection with venereal disease, however. In Lankford,
the court held that a husband who infected his wife with syphilis was
guilty of battery on the ground that his wife, "in confiding her person to
her husband," did not consent to infection with a "loathsome" dis-
ease.15 4 Similarly, in Crowdl v. Crowell,155 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a husband's concealment of the risk of venereal disease
infection vitiated his wife's consent to sexual intercourse and subjected
him to liability. 156
152 See C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1980).
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979). This concept reflects the legal
maxim, volenti non fit injuria-one is not legally injured who has either consented to the act
complained of or who was willing for the act to occur. The maxim presupposes that the party
is capable of giving consent to his own injury. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60,
§ 3.10, at 234-35; see also McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883).
154 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 596, 102 A. 63, 64 (1917). The court did not regard the hus-
band's belief that his disease had been cured as an adequate defense. Id
The Lankfordcase was a criminal battery action as opposed to a civil action. At that time
in Delaware, no civil action was maintainable between husband and wife because of the
interspousal tort immunity doctrine. See in/a notes 191-202 and accompanying text. The fact
pattern in Lankford, however, is sufficiently analogous to several of the genital herpes cases to
be relevant here.
There are parallels in other battery cases to the principle that consent to sexual activity is
not consent to exposure to venereal disease. For example, courts have concluded that the
consent to eat food is not consent to eat poison or drugs. See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 121 N.C.
677, 28 S.E. 547 (1897) (consent to eat candy is not consent to eat candy covered with croton
oil); see alsoJohnson v. State, 92 Ga. 36, 17 S.E. 974 (1893) (arsenic in coffee); Commonwealth
v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 (1873) (love powders in figs); cf. Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82
N.W. 142 (1900) (consent to medical treatment is not consent to lewd fondling).
155 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), reh g denied, 181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921).
156 Crowell, 181 N.C. at 68, 106 S.E. at 150.
Earlier English cases reached similar conclusions. See Regina v. Bennett, 4 Fost. &
Finlason's Reports 1105 (1866) (holding that fraud vitiates consent, and that woman who is
induced to have sexual intercourse without knowledge that her sexual partner has a venereal
disease is the victim of fraud); Regina v. Sinclair, 13 Cox's Crim. Law Cases 28 (1867) (man
who knew of his gonorrhea infection but failed to inform his sexual partner procured her
consent by fraud, thereby nullifying the consent). See also P. WINFIELD & J. JOLOWIcZ, ON
TORT 44 (10th ed. 1975) (fraudulent concealment of venereal disease should negate victim's
consent to cohabitation, making resultant infection a tortious battery); Fischer, Fraudulentdy
Induced Consent to Intentional Torts, 46 U. CINN. L. REV. 71, 73 (1977) (failure to inform partner
of venereal disease vitiates consent); Recent Cases, Husband and Wife-Rights of Wife Against
Husband and His Property-Wife's Right to Sue Her Husbandfor Torts-Assault, 34 HARV. L. REV.
676, 676 (1921) ("The married woman consents to the battery incident to connubial inter-
course, but in no wise to contact with [venereal disease]."); Recent Cases, Battery-Consent-
Mistake as to the Nature of the Offensive or Injurious Touch, 15 TEX. L. REV. 255, 255 (1937) (in
discussing De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), where plaintiff was in-
fected with crab lice by defendant-lover, suggesting as proper rule that plaintiff consented
only to intercourse, not to the contamination of which plaintiff had no knowledge. But see
Hegarty v. Shine, [1878] 14 Cox's Grim. Law Cases 124 (mere concealment of venereal dis-
ease not such a fraud to vitiate consent).
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Courts have also rejected the defense of consent when it is obtained
by express fraudulent misrepresentation. In Barbara A. v. John G., 157 an
unmarried woman who suffered an ectopic pregancy and underwent
surgery to save her life brought an action against the man who impreg-
nated her 58 She alleged that she relied on the man's intentional mis-
representation of his sterility when she consented to intercourse. In her
cross-complaint, she argued that the act of impregnation exceeded the
scope of her consent and that her consent to intercourse was fraudu-
lently induced.1 59 Based on these arguments, she contended that her
consent was invalid and, therefore, that she had established a cause of
action in battery. The court held that the facts stated a cause of action
for battery, 160 analogizing from the conclusion in Crowell and Lankford
that "a woman's consent to sexual intercourse [is] vitiated by the man's
fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection." 16 1
On the issue of invalid consent, the Restatement (Second) of Torts con-
tends that if an individual is induced to consent "by a substantial mis-
take concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent
of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other
or is induced by the other's misrepresentation," the consent is ineffec-
tive.162 On the basis of the Restatement's illustrations, a person's igno-
rance of a sexual partner's genital herpes infection constitutes such a
"substantial mistake" concerning the nature of the invasion of his
interests. 163
Thus, consent to intercourse should not bar recovery for genital
herpes infection. The consent goes to the act of intercourse, not to the
harmful contamination. If, however, one agrees to sexual activity with
full and accurate knowledge of a sexual partner's genital herpes infec-
tion, no action in battery will lie. 16 4
157 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
158 Id. at 375, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
159 Id.
160 The trial court had ruled that no cause of action was stated and had granted a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Id at 373, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
161 Id. at 381, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431. The court also held that the facts stated a cause of
action for deceit. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979).
163 The Restatement poses the hypothetical that if A consents to sexual intercourse with B,
who is aware that A does not know B has a venereal disease, B is subject to liability to A for
battery. Id at comment e, illustration 5. This example parallels the concealment aspect of
Crowdl and Lankford. If B misrepresents that he is free from venereal disease, despite his
knowledge of his infection, and that misrepresentation induces A to engage in sexual activity,
B is similarly subject to liability for battery. d. at comment h, illustration 11. This example
is analogous to Barbara A. v. John G.
164 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, § 3.10. This presumes that the infected
party has not misrepresented the disease, e.g., by stating that he is not presently infectious
when he is aware of an outbreak, or has not extracted consent by duress.
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3. Battely and Negh'gence: A Comparson
Valid reasons exist for pursuing a cause of action in battery in lieu
of, or in addition to, negligence. In some jurisdictions that bar tort ac-
tions between spouses, courts have created exceptions for intentional
torts such as battery.1 65 Further, a battery verdict permits a court to
award both punitive and compensatory damages. 66
Liability based solely on battery, however, would result in a more
limited range of liability than that based on negligence. As discussed, it
is more difficult to prove subjective "intent" in a battery action than it is
to prove objective reasonableness in a negligence action. Because the
primary objective of liability is to curtail the spread of genital herpes,
courts should adopt the broadest acceptable range of liability. More-
over, the mutual dependence inherent in a sexual relationship presumes
a degree of accountability that would impose a duty to protect against
the transmission of genital herpes. An obligation to disclose one's infec-
tion would fulfill this duty. Thus, negligence liability would not only be
more effective than battery in limiting the spread of genital herpes, but
it would also more accurately mirror the expectations of the parties.
165 See infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text. The following example is a situation
where a cause of action in battery would apply, but one in negligence would fail. A, who has
genital herpes and knows that he is currently infectious, fully discloses his disease to B, who
nonetheless consents to intercourse. A, in affirmatively disclosing the disease, meets the rec-
ommended standard of care. A does not know and has no way of knowing that B, because of
age or mental incapacity, is incapable of consent. B, as a result of sexual intercourse with A, is
infected. Although a negligence cause of action may not lie, the elements of a battery-intent
as well as harmful and unprivileged contact-are satisfied.
166 "Mere negligence" is not considered a sufficient basis for the award of punitive dam-
ages. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 2, at 10. There must be "circumstances of aggravation or
outrage," or "fraudulent" motive, or "such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the inter-
ests of others that [the] conduct may be called wilful or wanton." Id. at 9-10 (footnotes omit-
ted). See also Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1931) (general
discussion of the role of punitive damages in tort); Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55
N.Y.U.L. REv. 303, 303 n.1 (1980) (punitive damages awarded for intentional torts or when
defendant "has displayed a reckless indifference to the potentially harmful consequences of
his conduct"). State law punitive damage standards range from "gross negligence to reckless
disregard to various levels of wilfullness [sic] and wantonness." In re Northern Dist. of Califor-
nia, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983).
Plaintiffs have demanded punitive damages in several genital herpes suits. See, e.g., St.
Clair v. St. Clair, reported in Ostroff, supra note 2 (five million dollars in punitive damages);
Olson v. Olson, reportedin Williamson, supra note 2 (three million dollars in punitive damages).
In McGaw v. Mormann, No. C.L. 2021-0683, 29-46-F.F. 51-C (Iowa Dist. Ct., Wapello
County, filed June 28, 1983), the plaintiff demanded $150,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 1.
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C. Misrepresentation: Deceit In a Sexual Context1 67
Many theories of tort liability involve misrepresentation. 168 An in-
dividual may induce another to consent to a harmful contact by false
representation, and thereby commit a battery. He may negligently mis-
lead another into following a course of action that leads to injury. 169 As
a separate tort, the elements of misrepresentation include a false repre-
sentation by the defendant; the defendant's knowledge or belief of the
falsity of the representation or the absence of any reasonable basis for
the defendant to believe in its truth; the defendant's intention to induce
the plaintiff to act in reliance upon the misrepresentation; the plaintiff's
justifiable reliance upon the representation; and damage to the plaintiff
resulting from such reliance. 170 Although courts usually apply the tort
of misrepresentation only to commercial situations, 17 1 there is no reason
to reject such an action when noncommercial interests are involved. 172
A few courts have recently considered the applicability of this tort
to false representation made in a sexual context. In Stephen K v. Roni
L.,173 a paternity action, the defendant conceded that he was the father
but filed a cross-complaint for fraud 174 alleging that he had relied on the
mother's false representation that she had taken contraceptive measures.
The court affirmed the dismissal of the crass-complaint, and declined to
define a standard of conduct. 75 The court cited the "highly intimate
167 The tort of misrepresentation evolved from the common law action of deceit. James
& Gray, Misrepresentation-Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 286, 286-89 (1977). Courts have limited
actions in deceit to situations where an intent to mislead is present. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 105, at 684. Deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation also has been loosely referred
to as fraud. Id
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 22 scope note (1977).
169 See, e.g., C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, JR., supra note 152, at 291 (suit against crossing
guard who accidentally waved car into path of speeding train involves negligent misrepresen-
tation, but is tried as negligence suit).
170 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 60, § 7.1, at 528; W. PROSSER, supra note 59,
§ 105, at 685-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
171 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., supra note 60, § 7.1, at 528 (law of deceit limited to
misrepresentations that cause another to make unwise business judgment resulting in finan-
cial loss); see also Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749 (1930) (involves property interests affected
by commercial and sales transactions); Bohlen, Aisrepresentation As Deceit, Negligence or War-
ranty, 42 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1929) (applicable to financial, commercial, or economic mat-
ters).
Professor Green notes that injuries to "interests of personality which are brought about
through deception," Green, supra, at 749 (emphasis in original), may be classified as battery,
citing Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (cause of action in battery when
husband, knowing of his infection, communicated venereal disease to wife), reh'g denied, 181
N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921), or negligence, see Green, supra, at 749 n.6.
172 There have been few cases, however, upholding misrepresentation actions when per-
sonal injuries were involved. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 105, at 684.
173 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980).
174 Id. at 641, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619. The cross-complaint also alleged negligent misrepre-
sentation and negligence. Id.
175 Id. at 643, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
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nature of the relationship wherein the false representations may have
occurred." 76 Similarly, in Pamela P. v. Frank S, 177 a New York paternity
action involving a woman's false representation that she was using con-
traceptives, the appellate division held that any inquiry into the wo-
man's alleged fraud was an "impermissible" invasion of privacy. 178
In contrast, the court in Barbara A. v. John G 179 held that a man's
intentional misrepresentation of his sterility constituted a cause of action
for deceit.' 80 In Barbara A., the man had allegedly engaged in sexual
intercourse with the appellant after he falsely assured her that he was
sterile. As a result, she suffered an ectopic pregnancy and underwent
life-saving surgery, which rendered her sterile. The court distinguished
this situation, where the woman sought damages for injury to her own
body, from that of Stephen K., where child support was involved.' 8 ' The
court determined that the public policy concern for financial support of
a child prevented the mother's misrepresentation from being actionable
in Stephen K, but there was no social policy to prevent the misrepresen-
tation from being actionable in Barbara A.'s suit for personal injury.' 82
Because genital herpes clearly involves bodily injury, courts may also be
willing to apply misrepresentation to the genital herpes cases when the
elements of the tort are demonstrably present.
In many cases involving the transmission of genital herpes, the
plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of misrepresentation. The misrep-
resentation may be an intentional false statement, either in response to a
direct inquiry or as an unsolicited remark that one is free of sexually
communicable diseases. This element may also be satisfied if an individ-
176 Id. at 643, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620. According to the court, "[c]laims such as those
presented by plaintiff Stephen . . . arise from conduct so intensely private that the courts
should not be asked to nor attempt to resolve [them]." Id. at 643, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
177 88 A.D.2d 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982), appeal dismissed, 58 N.Y.2d 969, 447 N.E.2d
84, 460 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1983).
178 Id. at 866, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 767. The lower court had held that despite its finding of
paternity the mother's misrepresentation barred recovery of child support unless the mother
were unable to support the child's needs. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 443
N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). The court expressed its belief that the holding in Stephen
K. v. Roni L. had improperly ignored the "law of fraud and deceit." Id. at 979, 443 N.Y.S.2d
at 344.
179 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
180 Id at 377, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The court stated that the action for deceit was
sanctioned by CAL. CIv. CODE § 1709 (" 'One who willfully deceives another with intent to
induce him [or her] to alter his [or her] position to his [or her] injury or risk, is liable for any
damage which he [or she] thereby suffers.' "). 145 Cal. App. at 375, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
The appellate court also stated that the plaintiff had a cause of action in battery, see supra text
accompanying notes 157-61.
181 145 Cal. App. at 378-79, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
The Barbara A. court also rejected the applicability of a privacy defense. Id. at 380-81,
193 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31; see infla notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
182 145 Cal. App. at 379-80, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
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ual intentionally conceals the fact of disease from his sexual partner. 83
Because the threat of contracting this incurable disease discourages sex-
ual involvement, 184 an affirmative misrepresentation by the defendant
regarding his infection demonstrates his intent to induce another party
to rely on the misstatement and consent to sexual activity. Because an
individual generally expects truthfulness in the sexual relationship, a
plaintiff has a strong case for proving justifiable reliance. Finally, if gen-
ital herpes is communicated, the victim suffers damage.185
Although a prima facie case of misrepresentation can be estab-
lished, many courts may be reluctant to expand the scope of the tort of
misrepresentation to private sexual activity.'8 6 Alternative causes of ac-
tion are available, however. If the misrepresentation is intentional,
courts can impose liability in battery. If scienter is lacking, then a negli-
gence cause of action would be appropriate.18 7 Because stronger prece-
dent exists for imposing liability for the transmission of genital herpes in
battery and in negligence,188 these causes of action appear to be prefera-
ble avenues for recovery.18 9
III
TRADITIONAL DEFENSES TO LIABILITY FOR THE SEXUAL
TRANSMISSION OF DISEASE
In early cases involving the sexual transmission of disease, defend-
183 See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 106.
184 See Matthews, VD Rate in US. Takes Dramatic Turn Downward, Wash. Post, July 2,
1983, at 1, col. 4 (health officials note "fears of herpes").
185 See supra notes 27-39 & 47-51 and accompanying text.
186 But cf. Note, Fraud Between Sexual Partners Regarding the Use of Contraceptives, 71 KY. L.J.
593, 615 (1982-83) (fraudulent misrepresentation should be recognized as cause of action
where one partner misrepresents to other that contraceptives are being used).
187 In Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982), a
woman sued to recover the cost of an abortion, alleging that she had relied on her sexual
partner's assertion that he was sterile. The court held that because the defendant honestly
believed he was sterile, the plaintiff's right to recover was based on negligence, not fraud. Id.
at 946, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
188 See supra notes 106-14 & 139-64 and accompanying text.
189 Misrepresentation may offer a useful avenue for third party liability in herpes cases.
Suppose A either infects B with genital herpes or admits to B that he has the disease. A
subsequently dates C, a relative or close friend of B. C makes inquiries to B regarding A's
health. B fails to disclose A's infection. C contracts genital herpes from A. Is B liable to ?.
In Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N.Y. 209, 186 N.E. 675 (1933), a woman brought an action
against the father and sister of her former husband for false representations that had induced
her to marry. The father and sister had assured the plaintiff prior to marriage that her future
husband was in good health, although they knew the husband-to-be was tubercular and ad-
dicted to drugs. In ruling that the defendants were liable for damages sustained as a result of
the marriage, the court stated that "there comes a time when the truth must be spoken." Id.
at 213, 186 N.E. at 677. For contemporary evidence of reliance on third party information,
see The New Scarlet Letter, supra note 41, at 65 (account of man contacting best friend of wo-
man with whom he wanted to have sex to ask whether intended sexual partner had genital
herpes).
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ants, depending on their marital status, often relied on one of two de-
fenses. A defendant sued by his or her spouse would raise the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity, which precludes one spouse from maintain-
ing an action against the other for a personal tort. In extramarital or
premarital relationships, a defendant would argue that the illegality of
sexual activity itself precluded liability. In recent years, however, many
courts have either limited or rejected the applicability of these defenses
to tort liability. 19°
A. Interspousal Tort Immunity Doctrine
At common law, upon marriage, the legal existence of the wife was
incorporated into that of the husband and the two were considered "one
person in law."'' The legal incidents of marriage therefore prevented
one spouse from holding the other civilly liable for a tort occurring
either before or during marriage. 192
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has precluded liability
in several cases involving the sexual transmission of disease. 193 In Band-
fieldv. Bandfte/d,'94 a wife sued her former husband for infecting her dur-
ing marriage with an incurable venereal disease. In this 1898 decision,
the Michigan Supreme Court refused to permit the wife to maintain the
suit, stating that such an action "would be another step to destroy the
sacred relation of man and wife."' 195 Bandfield illustrates a principal ra-
tionale for the interspousal tort immunity doctrine-that to allow such
personal tort actions between spouses would destroy the peace and har-
190 An important affirmative defense to the negligent or intentional infection of genital
herpes is the statute of limitations. If the plaintiff fails to bring an action within the time set
forth by the appropriate state statute, then recovery will be barred. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross
(Lake County Ct. App. Ohio 1983, available on LEXIS as Ross vs. Ross) (if transmission of
genital herpes constitutes assault and battery, then one-year statute of limitation applies). See
also Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 338 (Wyo. 1979) (reversing district court award for negli-
gent transmission of gonorrhea on ground that statute of limitations barred action).
191 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
192 See McCurdy, Personal Injugy Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 303-07 (1959)
(discussing legal rights of married women at common law); see also Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76
N.J. 535, 539-42, 388 A.2d 951, 953-55 (1978) (reviewing history of interspousal tort immu-
nity doctrine).
193 Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 501, 118 P. 629, 631 (1911) (to permit divorced
wife to recover from husband for infecting her with venereal disease during marriage would
be "against public policy"); see aso Regina v. Clarence, [1888] 22 Q.B.D. 23 (marital privilege
permits husband to knowingly infect wife with venereal disease and escape liability for as-
sault).
In Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), the
Florida Supreme Court upheld the interspousal tort immunity doctrine and cited the follow-
ing language from 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wire § 396: "In accordance with [the common law]
rule. .. the wife cannot maintain an action against her husband for assault and battery, for
deliberately infecting her with a venereal disease." 200 So. 2d at 173.
'94 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898).
195 Id. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288.
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mony of the home. 96
In recent years the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has fallen
into judicial disfavor. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position
that "[a] husband or wife is not immune from tort liability to the other
solely by reason of [the marital] relationship."'' 97 A majority of states
have adopted this position by abrogating the doctrine entirely. 98 In
these jurisdictions, the doctrine will not bar suits involving liability for
the transmission of genital herpes. Other states apparently allow such
actions but only after a marriage has been terminated by divorce. 99
Several states have rejected interspousal tort immunity only as to inten-
tional torts;200 in these jurisdictions, plaintiffs would pursue a cause of
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F comment d (1979). For a critical
analysis of the rationales supporting the interspousal tort immunity doctrine, see Judge
Prager's dissent in Guffy ex rel. Reeves v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 105-13, 631 P.2d 646, 655-60
(1981).
At least one state has construed its married women's act as allowing a woman to main-
tain an action against her husband for the transmission of venereal disease. Crowell v. Crow-
ell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), reh'g denied, 181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921).
Beginning with Maine in 1844, every state enacted legislation to remove some or all of the
common law disabilities of married women. See McCurdy, supra note 192, at 308 & n.40. See
generally H. CLARK, supra note 133, § 9.1 (1968). In Crowell, the court held that the North
Carolina married women's act gave the wife the right to recover damages for injuries to her
person from her husband "as fully as against any one else." 180 N.C. at 521, 105 S.E. at 209.
The wife in Crowell sued her spouse for infecting her with venereal disease. The court af-
firmed a judgment in favor of the wife but acknowledged that prior to the adoption of the
married women's act, she could not have maintained the action. Id. at 520, 105 S.E. at 209.
The defendant's moral turpitude seems to have particularly influenced the court's decision.
[N]o principle of justice can maintain the proposition in law, or in morals,
that a debauchee, as the defendant admits himself to be, can marry a virtuous
girl, and, continuing his round of dissipation, [contract a] venereal disease,
communicate it to his wife,. . . subjecting her to humiliation and ruining her
physically for life,. . . yet be exempted from all liability by the assertion that
he and his wife are one ....
Id. at 523, 105 S.E. at 210. In contrast, the majority of American courts construed similar
enactments to permit a wife to maintain an action against her spouse for torts involving
property interests but not for tortious personal injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 895F comment c (1979); McCurdy, supra note 192, at 313-14.
In Bandfield, the court, after considering the Michigan married women's act, concluded
that absent an "express" statute a wife had no right to maintain an action at law for a per-
sonal tort against her spouse. 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288. See also Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 218 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1910) (construing a District of Columbia statute granting certain
legal rights to married women and holding that, under the statute, a wife did not have the
right to sue her spouse for battery); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 498-500, 118 P. 629,
629-30 (1911).
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(i) (1979).
198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F, at 287-89 (App. 1982).
199 See, e.g., Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971) (intentional
tort); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980) (intentional tort); see aso RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F, at 289-90 (App. 1982).
200 See, e.g., Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 268, 485 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1971) ("an
intentional tort inflicted by one spouse on another so clearly destroys the concept of unity that
the basis for the doctrine is lost"); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Bounds
v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
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action in battery rather than negligence. In those states that strictly
adhere to the interspousal tort immunity doctrine,201 the doctrine re-
mains a formidable barrier to the success of genital herpes suits.
20 2
B. Illegality of Sexual Conduct
In recognition of traditional moral and religious values, many juris-
dictions enacted criminal statutes against fornication and adultery.20 3
These statutes have permitted defendants in sexual transmission of dis-
ease cases who were not married to their sexual partners to argue that
the illegality of their sexual activity precluded liability. In several early
cases, courts upheld this argument as an absolute defense.204 In other
201 The following courts have upheld the doctrine of interspousal immunity for postnup-
tial torts: Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980);
Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980); Jones v. Swett,
244 Ga. 715, 261 S.E.2d 610 (1979); Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Hawaii 455 (1958); Vogel v.
Robison, 80 I11. App. 3d 312, 399 N.E.2d 688, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 944 (1980); Guffy ex
rel Reeves v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 631 P.2d 646 (1981); Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of
McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971); Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. App. 1980);
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 544 P.2d 444 (1975); Morrissett v.
Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184 (1964); Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383
N.E.2d 888 (1978); Asplin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 121 R.I. 51, 394 A.2d 1353 (1978); Chil-
dress v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1978); McKinney v. McKinney, 135 P.2d 940
(Wyo. 1943); see also Note, Torts-Interspousal Tort Immunity in Kansas: A Vestige ofa Bygone
Era-Guffy v. Guffy, 30 U. KAN. L. REv. 611, 611 nn.3 & 5 (1982) (listing state court deci-
sions on immunity doctrine).
Several courts that adhere to the immunity doctrine have held that the immunity does
not apply to torts committed before marriage. See, e.g., Chen v. Liao, 420 F. Supp. 472 (D.
Del. 1976) (applying Delaware law); Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969) (action for
premarital tort can be brought after divorce); O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285
(1964); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); Pearce v. Boberg, 89 Nev. 266,
510 P.2d 1358 (1973). In these jurisdictions, victims of genital herpes who contract the disease
from their spouse prior to marriage would appear to be allowed to sue.
202 See, e.g., Ross v. Ross (Lake County Ct. App. Ohio 1983, available on LEXIS as Ross
vs. Ross) (upholding directed verdict and dismissal of complaint as interspousal immunity
doctrine barred action for transmission of genital herpes). In one of the genital herpes suits,
St. Clair v. St. Clair, the law of Missouri which follows the interspousal tort immunity doc-
trine is controlling. The complaint, however, claims that Missouri decisions upholding the
doctrine violate the wife's "constitutional rights." Ostroff, supra note 2, at 40, col. 4.
203 Fornication is the "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse between two unmarried persons."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8
(Smith-Hurd 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980).
Adultery is the "[violuntary sexual intercourse of a married person" with an individual
other than the offender's spouse. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 47; see, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53 a-81 (West 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1980); see also D. MAcNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAWv 191 (1977)
(laws prohibiting adultery generally considered necessary as "moral expression of the sanctity
of the family").
204 E.g., Hegarty v. Shine [1878] 14 Cox's Crim. Law Cases 145. In Hegarty, a woman
sued her lover in battery for transmitting syphilis to her. The court refused to hear the case
on the theory of ex turpi casa non oritur actia (out of an illegal consideration, an action cannot
arise). Id at 150 (Palles, C.B.). Moreover, even if public policy did not preclude plaintiff's
suit, the court stated that her lover's failure to disclose did not constitute fraud and, therefore,
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cases, courts, although recognizing the defense of illegality, limited its
application to situations where the parties were of "equal guilt. ' 20 5
In contemporary society, however, changing social mores have led
to an acknowledgment, if not an acceptance, of sexual relationships be-
tween unmarried individuals. 20 6 Relaxed sexual standards, often de-
scribed as a "revolution" in the popular literature, 20 7 have led to more
liberal social attitudes. Court decisions parallel this change.
Two California courts have recently upheld a plaintiffs right to sue
for damages arising from a premarital sexual relationship. In Barbara A.
did not vitiate plaintiff's consent. "From such a relation [premarital sex], illegal and immoral
in itself, no duty can arise, and in the absence of such duty, the concealment (although inten-
tional and with a view to deceive), of a material fact, is . . .neither fraud nor evidence of
fraud." Id. See also Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 323, 55 P. 656, 658 (1898) (transmission of
gonorrhea during invalid marriage not actionable injury); Oberlin v. Upson, 84 Ohio St. 111,
117, 95 N.E. 511, 512 (1911) ("theory of the common law is that, since adultery and fornica-
tion are crimes, the woman is particeps crim'nis and hence. . . she cannot be heard-to com-
plain of a wrong which she helped to produce"); Recent Decisions, Consent-Criminal Assault
by Husbandon Wife-Venereal Disease, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 81, 82 (1918) (in civil cases involving
venereal disease infection "against good policy to permit a recovery by [unmarried] plaintiff
who exposes herself promiscuously, especially since she must have contemplated such a risk").
205 Eg., De Vail v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). In De Vall, the
plaintiff, a single woman, consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant allegedly be-
cause he promised to marry her. As a result, she became infected with crab lice. Although
the court recognized that no one by his own wrong acquires a right of action, it limited the
use of this principle to cases where the parties were equally culpable. In this case, the court
held that the defendant's actions were more culpable than the woman's premarital sexual
activity because of his misrepresentation and his fraudulent promise to marry. Id at 247.
In Panther v. McKnight, 125 Okla. 134, 256 P. 916 (1926), the plaintiff, relying on assur-
ances by the defendant that they were legally married, cohabited with him. The marriage,
however, was invalid. As a result of the cohabitation, the defendant infected the plaintiff
with venereal disease and she commenced this action to recover damages. The defendant
claimed that the plaintiff could not recover because she contracted the disease while violating
a public law. The court rejected this argument, holding that the defendant's concealment of
his disease as well as his misleading assurances of a lawful marriage were more culpable than
the plaintiffs illegal sexual activity. Id at 136, 256 P. at 918.
206 See M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970s, at 116 (1974) (1972 survey data for
all age groups indicated "dramatically increased acceptance" of premarital intercourse in
comparison to 1959 and 1968 surveys). Hunt's data also indicated a major increase in extra-
marital behavior for females between the ages of 18 and 24. Id. at 261-63; see a/so J. DELA-
MATER & P. MACCORQUODALE, PREMARITAL SEXUALITY 93 (1979) (data indicated
"marked decline" in number of young people who believed premarital intercourse unaccept-
able as compared with findings of earlier studies); V. PACKARD, THE SEXUAL WILDERNESS:
THE CONTEMPORARY UPHEAVAL IN MALE-FEMALE RELATIONSHIPS 33-79 (1968) (survey re-
sults indicate an increasing proportion of premarital intimacy among college females, and a
slightly higher incidence amont college males); Maykovich, Attitudes Versus Behavior in Extra-
marital Sexual Relations, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 693, 698 (1976) (permissive sexual norms in
America have induced many women to approve of extramarital sexual relations); Schmidt,
Sex and Society in the Eighties, 11 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 91 (1982) (commenting on
more permissive approaches to sexuality).
207 S. HITE, THE HITE REPORT 447-49 (1976); Leonard, The End ofSex, READER'S DIG.,
Mar. 1983, at 132 (1980 survey of over 100,000 American women indicating that "revolution"
occurred in sexual behavior).
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v. John G.,208 the court held that a woman stated a cause of action in
battery and deceit by alleging that she relied on the respondent's mis-
representation of sterility in consenting to sexual intercourse and, as a
result of intercourse, required surgery to correct an abnormal preg-
nancy.209 Furthermore, in Kathleen K v. Robert B.,210 the court found
that the plaintiff stated a cause of action by charging the defendant with
infecting her with genital herpes.211 Although neither court expressly
rejected the defense of illegality of sexual conduct, neither decision fo-
cused on the legality of the litigants' sexual relationship. Thus, it ap-
pears that many, if not all, courts would no longer recognize the defense
of illegality of conduct in sexual transmission of disease cases if such a
defense were offered.
The -nonenforcement, 212 modification, 213 or repeal of statutes
prohibiting fornication and adultery further supports the position that
courts will no longer accept the defense of illegality. In Alice D. v. Wil-
liam A., 214 the court permitted the plaintiff to recover abortion costs
even though her pregnancy resulted from a relationship that violated a
New York statute prohibiting adultery. 215 The court noted that this
statute had rarely been enforced during the past three decades216 and
held that invoking it here would be an injustice.2 17
The more liberal sexual attitudes, the nonenforcement of statutes
punishing adultery and fornication, and the recent repeal or modifica-
tion of many such statutes suggest that courts will accord little weight to
the defense of illegality of sexual activity in transmission of genital
herpes suits. Even in jurisdictions that wish to champion traditional
morality, the need to curb the spread of genital herpes in order to pro-
tect public health should outweigh any perceived need to punish indi-
vidual plaintiffs for premarital or extramarital sexual relations.
208 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
209 Id. at 375, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426; see infra text accompanying notes 224-32.
210 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
211 Id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77; see infra text accompanying notes 233-37.
212 See D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 203, at 187 (fornication statutes rarely
prosecuted or enforced); G. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUcT 45 (1961)
("minute" number of adultery prosecutions); M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAv 155 (1951)
(nonenforcement of fornication and adultery statutes is "general rule").
213 Compare G. MUELLER, supra note 212, at 84-88 (state-by-state listing of adultery and
fornication statutes) with C. MASSEY & R. WARNER, SEX, LIVING TOGETHER, AND THE LAW
22-31 (1974) (same).
214 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Civ. Ct. 1982).
215 Id at 946-49, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 355-57.
216 Id. at 947, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
217 Id
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PRIVACY: A FINAL CONCERN
Any proposal to impose tort liability for the transmission of genital
herpes must confront the argument that it violates the constitutional
right to privacy.218 Three recent California decisions have addressed
the right to privacy issue in the context of intimate relationships. In
Stephen K v. Roni L.,21 9 a paternity action, the defendant crossclaimed
for damages, alleging that he had had sexual relations with the child's
mother, but that he had relied on her false assurances that she had taken
oral contraceptives. 22 0 The trial court sustained the mother's demurrer
to the crossclaim.2 21 On appeal, the court expressed an unwillingness to
supervise the promises of two consenting adults "as to the circumstances
of their private sexual conduct. '222 The court affirmed the lower court's
ruling, indicating that to do otherwise would "encourage unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to
privacy. '22 3
In a second case, Barbara A. v. John G.,2 24 a woman brought an ac-
tion against her sexual partner for damages2 2 5 after suffering a life-
threatening ectopic pregnancy.2 2 6 She had consented to sexual relations
in reliance on the defendant's knowingly false representation of his ste-
rility. The trial court, relying on Stephen K., ruled that the woman had
failed to state a cause of action.227 On appeal, however, the court distin-
guished Stephen K. on the ground that it involved damages for "wrongful
birth," rather than for direct bodily injury.2 28 Thus, Stephen K. involved
public policy considerations regarding parental child support that were
absent in Barbara A.2 29 The appellate court further noted that the right
218 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (ban on distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons is unwarranted governmental intrusion into individual's right to
privacy); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (individual has right "to be free, except
in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into [his] privacy");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (state law prohibiting use of contracep-
tives by married couples unconstitutionally intrudes on right of marital privacy). See generally
Kohn, Conflicting Rights of Privacy and the Duty of Disclosure Between Sexual Partners, 11 LAW,
MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 264-70 (1983).
219 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980).
220 Id at 641-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
221 Id. at 642, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
222 Id at 644-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
223 Id at 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
224 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
225 Id. at 373, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
226 In an ectopic pregnancy, the fertilized egg develops outside the uterus. Id at 373 n. 1,
193 Cal. Rptr. at 425 n.1 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1013 (3d unabridged
lawyer's ed. 1972)).
227 Id at 374, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
228 Id at 378-79, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
229 Id.
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to privacy in sexual matters is "not absolute, ' 230 and cited various ex-
amples of government intervention in matters affecting sexual activ-
ity.231 The court concluded that the right to privacy does not "insulate
from liability one sexual partner who by intentionally tortious conduct
causes physical injury to the other." 232
In Kathleen K v. Robert B.,233 a California appellate court again ad-
dressed the privacy issue. In Kathleen K., a woman sued her former lover
for infecting her with genital herpes. The trial court, relying on the
right to privacy argument asserted in Stephen K., ruled that the plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action.234 The appellate court reversed, holding
that Barbara A. was controlling. 235 The court noted that the "right of
privacy is not absolute" and could be "outweighed by the right of the
state to protect the health, welfare and safety of its citizens. '236 The
court determined that the tortious nature of the defendant's conduct in
failing to disclose his infection, together with the state interest in arrest-
ing the spread of "contagious and dangerous diseases," established a
cause of action.237
Understandably courts are reluctant to sanction state intrusion into
the privacy of intimate relationships. The critical question, however, is
whether such intrusion is warranted in particular circumstances. In the
past, various state jurisdictions have enacted legislation imposing penal-
ties for the transmission of venereal disease.238 These laws demonstrate
the significant community concern regarding the health consequences of
sexually transmitted diseases. This concern suggests that courts should
not permit the right of privacy to shield individuals who, by communi-
cating genital herpes, endanger community health and inflict physical
injury on their sexual companions.239 Instead, courts, in imposing tort
liability for the sexual transmission of genital herpes, must subordinate
the right of privacy to the societal interest of protecting the public
health.
230 Id. at 380, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
231 Id. at 380-81, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31. Specifically, the court cited penal statutes
covering forcible and consensual sexual acts, the prohibition of spousal rape, and the various
civil law provisions concerning paternity. Id.
232 Id. at 381, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
233 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
234 Id. at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
235 Id. at 998, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
236 Id. at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
237 Id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
238 See supra note 95.
239 Cf Note, supra note 186, at 615 (where false representation of contraceptive use, right
to privacy in sexual relations should not preclude legal action where "compelling state inter-
est" for recovery).
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CONCLUSION
The strength of the common law is embodied in its capacity to re-
spond to societal needs. The common law can fashion appropriate rules
to advance community goals and to ensure that the losses arising from
human interaction are distributed equitably.
American society now confronts an epidemic spread of genital
herpes, a disease that infects upwards of ten percent of the population.
Because the disease is presently incurable, a continuing increase in the
number of individuals afflicted is anticipated. The health risks associ-
ated with genital herpes underscore the compelling need to arrest its
spread.
Tort law offers a means to serve the public policy objective of cur-
tailing the spread of this disease while providing compensation to its
many innocent victims. Through causes of action in negligence and bat-
tery, courts may impose liability on those who transmit genital herpes to
their sexual partners.
Actions in negligence, by providing a broader range of liability,
more ably serve this policy objective. Further, by recognizing that the
sexual relationship creates a duty to protect one's partner from the sex-
ual transmission of genital herpes, the law of negligence offers the frame-
work to establish that the standard of care is the obligation to disclose
one's infection to a sexual partner. Such disclosure would not only curb
the spread of genital herpes but would also foster accountability and
trust in the sexual relationship.
Louis A. Alexander
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